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R ECENTLY, the United States Court of Military Appeals, in
United States v. Cothern,' reversed a long line of military
precedents, dating back at least a century and a half, which had
settled the rule in the law of desertion2 that there being an un-
explained prolonged absence, "the court will be justified in in-
ferring from that alone an intent to remain absent permanently. ",3
This oft-criticized case4 has disturbed military lawyers more than
any other decision by that Court in recent years.
This article constitutes the second half of a study made of
* Associate Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law. B.A., Hunter Col-
lege, 1954; LL.B., Columbia University School of Law, 1956; LL.M., New York Uni-
versity School of Law, 1957; LL.M., University of Chicago School of Law, 1961.
Member of the Bars of New York, District of Columbia, Florida, United States
Supreme Court, and United States Court of Military Appeals. Author, The Law
of AWOL (Oceana, 1957), and numerous other legal articles.
'8 USCMA 158, 23 CMR 382 (1957).
2 UCMJ, Art. 85a(1), 10 U. S. C. Sec. 8.85 (1958).
3 Manual for Courts-Martial, U. S., 1951, fr 164. In Hearings Before a Subcom-
mittee of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, 66th Cong., 1st Sess., on S. 64,
A Bill to Establish Military Justice 1375 (1919), Professor Edmund M. Morgan
"read a provision of the court-martial manual which said that if a man was absent
without leave for an extended period, that justified an inference of desertion."
4 For the latest attack on It, see Fratcher, "Presidential Power to Regulate Mili-
tary Justice: A Critical Study of Decisions of the Court of Military Appeals," 34
N. Y. U. L. Rev. 861, 881-2 (1959).
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the prolonged absence rule by this author. In the first half,' this
author discussed the history, importance, function, and current
status of the prolonged absence rule in the military offense of
desertion. This half will deal with the much litigated question
of what constitutes a prolonged absence within the meaning of
the rule.
This study was undertaken at the suggestion of several re-
viewers of this author's book on AWOL,0 who drew attention in
their reviews to the need for an examination of this area in light
of the Cothern decision. 7 Their expertise in this field makes those
suggestions significant in showing the importance of this area of
the military law.
II. THE FUNCTIONAL BASIS FOR DETERMINING WHAT Is A
"PROLONGED ABSENCE' "
One of the most difficult problems in trying a case of deser-
tion, where the accused is charged with absence without leave with
intent to remain away permanently, and the prolonged absence
rule is sought to be applied, is to determine the question of how
long a period of absence will constitute a "prolonged" absence.
The Manual for Courts-Martial gives no guide for this.
This problem is by no means new. It must invariably arise
whenever the prolonged absence rule is sought to be applied to
a particular case. It has been wrestled with since the earliest
reported desertion cases.
To solve the dilemma of finding what a prolonged absence is,
there appears to be four solutions, viz.:
1. Junk the prolonged absence rule completely.
2. Leave the determination of what a prolonged absence is
to the court in all cases.
5 Avins, "Proof of Desertion Through Prolonged Absence," 44 Cornell L. Q. 356
(1959).
6 Avins, The Law of AWOL (New York, 1957).
7 Proof of Desertion, supra, n. 5 at p. 357, n. 10. For a later suggestion, see
Barron, Review, 25 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 698 (1958).
ABSENCE AS PROOF OF INTENT TO DESERT
3. Set an arbitrary standard of time beyond which an ab-
sence will be deemed prolonged.
4. Attempt to deduce what period of absence can be con-
sidered prolonged, taking into consideration the function of the
rule and how it can be expected to operate in light of modern
living conditions.
Little needs to be said in respect to the first "solution." To
eliminate a prolonged absence as a factor from which a court
may infer an intent to desert is to virtually repeal Article 85a(1).
To treat all unauthorized absentees, regardless of their intent,
alike, has a very questionable policy basis. At any rate, this
question belongs in the legislative, and not the military judicial
branch.
The second solution, although it has inherent vices almost as
great as the first, is at least not without some precedent. Thus,
one Army Board of Review had this to say:
Determination of the question as to whether an absence is
'much prolonged' * * within the meaning of the quoted
clause, must depend upon the circumstances of the absence.
An arbitrary yardstick of time may not be applied. The
absence must be so prolonged that, considered in the light
of proved causes and motives or in the light of a lack of
rational explanation, it leads in sound reason to a conclusion
that the soldier did not intend to return.8
In spite of the sweet reasonableness which the above so-
called "solution" exudes on the surface, it is in fact not a solution
but an abdication. It is a confession by military lawyers that
they are incapable of further defining the word "prolonged" than
to say that it is an absence from which one may infer an intent
to desert, with the further note appended that such intent may
only be inferred from an absence which is "prolonged." Such
circular definition is in reality an abandonment of the entire
8 CM 213817, Fairchild, 10 BR 287, 289 (1940).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
attempt at law formation to a military jury of officers who are
even less qualified to determine what absence is prolonged than
is a lawyer. This resolution of the problem, with the inevitable
crazy-quilt pattern of results, wherein one court will find an
absence of five days prolonged while another finds that five months
is not prolonged, lacks even the benefits of a lawyer-imposed
arbitrary uniformity by which a defendant can at least know at
what point the court will switch labels (and punishments) on his
unauthorized sojourn. It is a wholesale surrender to the rough
justice of the lay fact-finder. Admittedly, there are often times
when the law cannot provide precise boundary lines, and when a
jury of laymen can come to as satisfactory a solution as a lawyer,
in a border area, but this is no excuse for allowing a court-martial
to roam as it will throughout the entire range without signposts
or markers. The existence of twilight or dusk should not prevent
a law officer of a court-martial from declaring that, as a matter
of law, noon occurs during the day and midnight during the night.
For this reason, the second solution cannot be deemed satisfactory
except in very limited circumstances.
The third solution, to select an arbitrary point of thne
beyond which an absence will be deemed to be prolonged, at least
has the merit of being uniform. Indeed, any process by which
a point of time is finally selected partakes to some extent of the
third solution, for to pick a point of time after which an absence
becomes "prolonged" and before which it is not is admittedly
somewhat of an arbitrary process. Thus, if 30 days is selected,
it is hard to say why 29 days should not be considered as a pro-
longed absence also. Yet, it must not be forgotten that the selec-
tion of some period of time has distinct advantages both for the
accused as well as the government. The law is thus rendered
certain, and an absentee thereby knows when he begins to run
the risk of being tagged a deserter.
However, the selection of a purely arbitrary period of time
does have some drawbacks. Chief among them is the fact that
it is a dubious test for the statutory standard that the accused
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did in fact entertain an intent to make his estrangement from the
service a permanent one. (It is only denominated "dubious"
because, if the period were well-publicized, it would tend to induce
those absentees who intended to come back to do so before their
absence became "prolonged," as thus defined, to avoid the more
severe penalties of desertion, and thus increase the correlation
between prolonged absences and intention to desert in fact.)
Another serious objection, although of a much more transitory
nature, is that at least one of the judges of the Court of Military
Appeals is not likely to take kindly to the idea of having what
a "prolonged" absence is determined through a process whereby
one of the Judge Advocates General is blindfolded and picks a
number out of a hat.9 There are other disadvantages inherent
in a set, arbitrary figure, of a more minor nature, and it therefore
appears clear that a better scheme for determining how protracted
the absence must be should be found.
The last, and it would seem, the best way of determining what
a prolonged absence is would be to use, as a guide, the function
of the prolonged absence rule in determining whether the accused
entertained the requisite intent to desert, and how the operation
of that rule would be affected in light of other factors in society
generally which impel or deter this intent.
In discussing the function of the prolonged absence rule, it
must always be remembered that a finding of intent to desert is
not a necessary consequence of a prolonged absence. Thus, there
is no conclusive presumption, or more properly, rule of law, which
declares that a person who is absent without authority for a
protracted period is guilty of desertion, as there is where a
person fraudulently enlists in service without a proper separation
from the one in which he currently serves.10 At most, only an
inference is created.
9 This is the way this author reads Chief Judge Quinn's views in United States
v. Deain, 5 USCMA 44, 17 CMR 44 (1954).
10 Art. 85a(3), UCMJ.
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One commentator has thus characterized presumptions:
The presumptions which operate to compel the assumption
of B upon the establishment of A owe their existence to judi-
cial demands for instruments (a) to furnish an escape from
an otherwise inescapable dilemma or to work a purely pro-
cedural convenience, (b) to require the litigant to whom in-
formation as to the facts is the more readily accessible to
make them known, (c) to make more likely a finding in accord
with the balance of probability, or (d) to encourage a finding
consonant with the judicial judgment as to sound social
policy.,,
Basing an analysis of the prolonged absence rule on the above
paragraph, it seems clear that (d) is inapplicable. There appears
to be no social policy either in favor of or against inferring an
intent to desert from a protracted absence.
On the surface, it might appear that (c) does have some
application. Certainly, when an absence is much prolonged, it is
more probable than not that the accused at some time decided not
to return. However, in a desertion case, the prosecution must
prove the requisite intent beyond a reasonable doubt. A mere
preponderance of the probabilities cannot suffice. Tested by these
standards, therefore, the fact that it is more likely than not that
the absentee did entertain the requisite intent, when standing
alone, does not justify the presence of the prolonged absence rule.
The situation used to illustrate the first reason given above
for the existence of presumptions has an interesting parallel to
the prolonged absence rule. Professor Morgan declares in his
article that the presumption that a person absent for seven years
is dead is designed to solve an otherwise insoluble problem as to
whether the person has died or not.'2 Likewise, the prolonged
absence rule permits, in a somewhat analogous fashion, the solu-
tion of the question as to whether an unauthorized absentee has
deserted or not.
11 Morgan, "Instructing the Jury on Presumptions and Burden of Proof," 47
Harv. L. Rev. 59, 77 (1933).
12 Id., at p. 78.
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As Professor Morgan notes, the presumption of death after
seven years "has no basis at all in human experience." Quite the
contrary, it is generally very much at war with human experience.
If a man, 20 years of age, should vanish, his life expectancy
would be 50 years more. Of this we have scientific evidence.
Moreover, we could not be morally certain that he was dead for
at least another 30 years. And yet we fix the time of his demise
at only seven years, for we can wait no longer for the settlement
of human affairs.
When a recruit of 20 goes absent, we also cannot be certain
that he will not return until 80 years have elapsed. Indeed, it
is within the range of possibility (however remote) that he has
at no time entertained an intent to desert. But, unlike the death
of the recruit, it is highly improbable. Human experience would
contradict such a holding.
To bridge the gap between the probability that prolonged
absence indicates an intent to desert and the requisite moral cer-
tainty necessary to convict, one student commentator has sug-
gested, in a somewhat different context, military necessity. 13 The
analogy to judicial necessity as the lever which elevates the seven
year presumption-of-death rule from a scientific improbability to
a rule of judicial conduct normally adopted only when supported
by a preponderance of probabilities seems striking. The sugges-
tion of military necessity is not without merit, but it appears that
a firmer basis for the rule can be found.
In determining the proper function of the prolonged absence
rule, it must always be borne in mind that an inference of intent
to desert may not be drawn merely from the prolonged absence
alone. The rule also requires that there be "no satisfactory
explanation of it." It is therefore always open to the defendant
to rebut the possible inference by coming forward and explaining
the reason for his absence. This being true, it therefore appears
that the main function of the prolonged absence rule is to shift
the burden of coming forward with evidence which is almost
13 Note, 46 Geo. L. J. 354, 359 (1958).
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always in the exclusive possession of the defendant. When the
defendant fails to adduce evidence, the only logical inference is
that his activities during his absence are inconsistent with any
other state of mind than an intent to remain away permanently.
When he adduces evidence, whether this evidence is enough to
dispel the inference created by his absence is a question of fact,
and is properly left to the court to determine. As Professor
Morgan has declared:
The reasons behind this class of presumptions also require
that the evidence produced should be credited by the trier of
fact. The control over, or peculiar knowledge of, the actual
relevant evidence is not to have its burdensome consequences
dissipated by the production of matter which the trier cannot
accept as worthy of credence. Such control and knowledge
present too fruitful opportunities for fabrication to permit
the mere introduction of uncredited testimony to destroy the
presumption.
14
Since the real function of the prolonged absence rule is not
to determine what period of absence logically gives rise to an
inference of intent to desert in vacuo, but rather after what period
of time it is logical to shift the burden of explanation to the
defendant, it follows that the absence must be long enough so
that there is a reasonable probability at the very least that the
requisite intent was formed. Since all absentees are aware of all
the circumstances surrounding their absences, if they thereafter
refuse to divulge those circumstances, it can only mean that
these unknown circumstances, taken together with the length of
absence, lead in sound reason to the conclusion that at some time
the absentee harbored the intent not to come back.
To determine how this minimal period is to be fixed, it is first
necessary to decide what test may rationally be used to find the
requisite intent. An examination of the circumstances, other than
prolonged absence, which are commonly used to find the necessary
14 Morgan, "Some Observations Concerning Presumptions," 44 Harv. L. Rev.
06, 927 (1931). See also United States v. Green, 5 CMR 588, 592 (ACM, 1952).
ABSENCE AS PROOF OF INTENT TO DESERT
intent discloses in respect to a surprisingly large number of them
a single common denominator, viz., that the accused was reminded
of his obligation to be present with his military unit and rejected
this obligation in his own mind.
For example, one of the factors mentioned in the Manual for
Courts-Martial is that the accused was in the vicinity of military
installations and yet failed to surrender. The reason why this
would tend to indicate that he had the intent to desert is that
each time he saw the installation or various servicemen he must
necessarily have been reminded that he was AWOL, yet he con-
sciously chose not to return. Likewise, it has been repeatedly
held that where an accused evades apprehension, by assuming a
false identity, for instance, this tends to prove that he intended
not to return. The reason for this is the same; each time the
accused gave a false name or rank, he was reminded in his own
mind of his dereliction, yet each of these times he chose not to
return. On the other hand, it has been repeatedly held that when
an accused is drunk while AWOL, this would tend to lessen the
probability that he intended to desert; during the period of his
intoxication he probably had no reminders or made no choices
not to return.
Of course, it may be argued that each time the accused made
the choice not to return, his choice was limited to a temporary
sojourn. As to each individual choice, it is true that it is just
as probable that the dereliction intended was temporary as it is
that it was permanent. However, this is not true collectively.
By the laws of chance, as the choices in favor of absence multiply,
the chances also multiply that some one of those choices was in
favor of a permanent absence. Thus, as the absence becomes
more and more prolonged, and the choices made in favor of
absence increase, it becomes progressively more probable that one
of those choices (and not, of course, necessarily the last one), was
made in favor of desertion, until a point is reached where a court-
martial of reasonable military men can be morally certain that
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one of those choices was made in favor of a permanent absence.",
And to prove desertion, the prosecution need not prove which
choice made was the vital one; it is sufficient to establish that
some one of them was, for an absence without leave becomes de-
sertion when the accused entertains, even for a fleeting moment,
the intent not to return. Hence, to find the minimum period which
could be categorized as "prolonged," one must find that period
during which a sufficient number of reminders were presented to
the defendant so that his failure to return gives rise to the
inference that during one of these reminders he decided not to
return at all.
In selecting a period of time, military courts should not
operate in vacuo. They should select that period of time which
is most likely to be of actual significance to an absentee. While
the selection of a month is, admittedly, to some extent arbitrary,
it appears to be less arbitrary than any other period of time.
A month is a definite and distinct period in time in American
life. The end of the month constitutes a time of special signifi-
cance in the commercial world. Bills are sent monthly, bank state-
ments are sent monthly, and numerous other everyday business
transactions are on a month-to-month basis. Typically, the period
of grace for the late payment of an insurance premium is 30 days.
Indeed, it may be said to be an analogy to AWOL, although it is
somewhat perverted, that vacations in industry and furloughs in
the service generally last no more than a month. American serv-
icemen, being part of the American community, know the signifi-
cance of the end of a month's time as a period of reassessment
of one's position.
More to the point, after a month of AWOL has elapsed, the
absentee has failed to receive a pay check, and is thus graphically
reminded of the ever-growing length of his absence. The elapse
of a month's time therefore becomes a logical and convenient time
15 That is why the period during which an accused was in jail, although counted
as AWOL, is not considered part of the prolonged absence necessary to prove the
requisite intent to desert. During this period, the accused had no opportunity to
make choices to stay away. See United States v. Mize, 11 CMR 587 (NCM, 1953).
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for an absentee to reassess his position, and if he still does not
return, a court of men familiar with the significance of this period,
under some circumstances may reasonably begin to believe that
the absentee harbored, deep in the recesses of his mind, an intent
not to come back at all.
Such fragmentary scientific and social science evidence as is
available tends to support the conclusion that the loss of a pay
check and the withdrawal of a source of funds from the accused
for an entire month, especially where he is subsisting without
benefit of military rations or messes, barracks or quarters, and
other necessities of life normally provided by the military service,
constitutes a sharp reminder to the accused of his dereliction.
Thus, in one of the earliest studies of the causes of desertion, it
was noted that the financial difficulties of the accused, and the
attractiveness of higher pay from civilian jobs, was a major cause
for desertion, and more significantly, as a motive, it caused pro-
portionately more desertions than AWOLs.16 The commentator
then went on to note that "In general, the statement is correct
that desertion occurs when the 'pull outward' exceeds the 'pull
inward.' ',"T Since the fact that accused has lost his source of
funds is a strong "pull inward," it appears to follow that such
a strong "pull outward" as would outweigh this factor after the
accused begins to feel the financial pinch resulting from his ab-
sence may properly serve as the basis for an inference that this
urge has impelled the accused to contemplate a permanent sepa-
ration from the service.
Several naval studies made at the end of World War II also
cast light on this problem. In one study of a thousand sailors
who had committed desertion, AWOL, or AOL, it was found that
only 30% are absent over 30 days, and the percentage absent
over 90 days is only 7%. s Since, in another study of motives for
16Woodbury, "Causes for Military Desertion; A Study in Criminal Motives,"
12 J. Crim. L. & Crim. 213 (1921).
17 Id., at p. 218.
Is Locke, Cornsweet, Bromberg and Apuzzo, "Study of One Thousand Sixty-
Three Naval Offenders." 44 U. S. Naval Medical Bulletin 73 (Jan. 1945). Of this
group, selected at random, 1,000 had been sentenced because of unauthorized ab-
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these unauthorized absences, it has been shown that the reasons
given for absence without leave are almost all of a very non-
compelling nature, 9 it would seem to follow that any serviceman
who goes absent without leave should be able to return in a
relatively short period of time if he intends to return at all, and
that most of those who do intend to return do come back in a
relatively short period of time.
In one study of particular interest, the authors found that,
of the men interviewed, 76% had intended to remain away less
than 30 days. 0 They also stated that, according to the admissions
of the absentees themselves, "Money problems played a role in
causing 48% to absent themselves. About 45% of the group sur-
rendered when they were 'broke.' ,2 They have also concluded:
Invariably the man who surrenders is broke. Many who are
apprehended freely admit that they would have surrendered
earlier except that their money held out or that civilian em-
ployment was so easily obtained.
There is a close correlation between pay day and absence.
Most absences occur immediately after men draw pay.2
From all of the above, it can be concluded that a period of
absence of no less than 30 days should be necessary for a finding
of a prolonged absence. Only after 30 days has elapsed can it be
said that the absentee has been gone sufficiently long so that the
sence. Of these 1,000 absentees, 758 had been AOL and 242 had been AWOL. The
average absence over leave was 33.09 days; the median was 15.93 days. The aver-
age absence without leave was 36.25 days; the median was 23.20 days. Those AOL
over 90 days were 52 in number; between 60 and 90 days, 52 in number; and
between 30 and 60 days, 122 in number. Those AWOL over 90 days were 17 in
number, between 60 and 90 days, 16 in number, and between 30 and 60 days, 49
in number. No distinction was made between those convicted of desertion and
those convicted only of unauthorized absence.
19 Bromberg, Apuzzo, and Locke, "A Psychological Study of Desertion and Over-
leave in the Navy," 44 U. S. Naval Medical Bulletin 558 (March 1945).
20 Boshes and Hermann, "Study of the Naval Delinquent by Questionnaire," 38
J. Crim. Law & Crim. 218 (1947) at 224, #24.
21 Id., at 227, #43. For the financial effect on the family of a serviceman who is
AWOL, see Chappell, "Naval Offenders and Their Treatment," 9 Federal Probation,
April-June 1945, No. 2. p. 3.
22 I d., at 230.
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burden of explanation should be shifted to him under any circum-
stances.
For reasons similar to those noted above, it appears from a
functional standpoint that the outermost limit which a court ought
to be able to go in finding that an absence was not prolonged
is 90 days. It seems clear that after a quarter of a year an
accused has had sufficient choice-points so that his failure to
return should invariably place upon him the burden of explana-
tion. In addition, a three-month period also has significance of
its own. Many business transactions are on a quarterly basis,
such as the payment of various kinds of taxes, insurance pre-
miums, dividends, and interest. Here again is another turning-
point period, and if the accused still fails to return, it seems that
any rational group of military men can logically infer, absent a
sufficient explanation, that the accused at some point intended
never to do so.
III. THE PRECEDENT BASIS FOR THE DETERMINATION
1. WHAT PRECEDENTS CAN BE INCLUDED
The section above has formulated a functional basis for de-
termining what a "prolonged" absence is. The precedent basis
for making that determination will now be taken up.
Before discussing specific precedents, however, it must be
noted that not all desertion cases which are found in the appendix
will be discussed herein. The large majority of these cases will
not be discussed specifically.
While all of the cases in the appendix bear to a greater or
a lesser extent on what a "prolonged" absence is, most of them
turned in large part on other circumstances in the case, or are
repetitive of cases which will be discussed and which are better
known or of more significance. The only cases which will be
discussed specifically herein are those in which the reviewing
tribunal explicitly, in its opinion, dealt with the question of
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whether the absence was prolonged or not, or, in a few instances,
where the decision is for other reasons of special interest. For
all other cases, reference should be made to the appendix.
Cases, for the purposes of discussion, have been divided up
into seven groups according to the length of absence involved.
The first group, involving absences from a fraction of a day to
ten days, was chosen because old Army and Navy regulations
required that an accused be dropped as a deserter after a ten-day
absence. 3 The second group, involving absences from 11 days
to 30 days, was selected because current service regulations pro-
vide that an absentee be dropped as a deserter after 30 days
and because the 1954 Amendment to the Table of Maximum Pun-
ishments provides for a substantially higher maximum penalty
for AWOL in excess of 30 days. 4 The third group, involving
absences from 31 days to 60 days, was set up because the Table
of Maximum Punishments of the 1951 Manual provided for a
substantially higher maximum penalty for unauthorized absences
in excess of 60 days. 5 The remaining groups, absence from 61
days to 90 days, absence from 91 days to six months, and absence
for over six months, were selected on the basis of the groups
which the precedents themselves seemed to fall into most readily,
on the functional basis of the rule itself, and on the basis of
periods beyond which a higher penalty might be imposed for
unauthorized absence or desertion in present or past tables of
maximum punishments and other similar sources.
26
23 See Reed v. United States, 252 Fed. 21 (2d Cir., 1918) ; Howland, Dig. Ops.
JAG 1862-1912 (Wash. 1912), Desertion, XVIC5, p. 421.
24 Executive Order 10565, September 28, 1954. The 1917 manual also used thirty
days for this purpose. Manual for Courts-Martial, U. S .Army, 1917, 349, p. 162.
In regard to current regulations regarding dropping absentees as deserters, see
AR 630-10, 2d; U. S. Navy BuPers Manual Art. c-7806, p. 174; and AFM 171-6,
Chap. 3, § A, 2d, p. 18. See also Pay of Knicker, 23 Comp. Gen. 44 (1943).
25 Manual for Courts-Martial, U. S., 1951, 127c, p. 220. This is also true for
certain prior manuals. See Manual for Courts-Martial, U. S. Army, 1921, 349, p.
277; Manual for Courts-Martial, U. S. Army, 1928, f 104c, p. 97; Manual for Courts-
Martial, U. S. Army and U. S. A. F., 1949, 117c, p. 134.
26 For example, after an unauthorized absence of three months, the President
was formerly authorized to drop an officer from the rolls of the Army for deser-
tion. Act of Jan. 19, 1911, c. 22, 36 Stat. 894, and R. S. § 1229, formerly 10 U. S.
C. A. §§ 574, 575, repealed May 5, 1950, c. 169, §§ 14(b) and (c), 64 Stat. 147. And
see Newton v. United States, 18 Ct. Cl. 435 (1883). In the New York State Con-
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2. ABSENCE FROM A FRACTION OF A DAY TO TEN DAYS
An examination of the precedents wherein the defendant was
convicted of desertion for an absence without leave which did not
exceed ten days reveals that in almost all of the cases, both where
the appellate tribunal sustained the conviction as well as where
it reversed the finding of intent to desert, there were other cir-
cumstances in the case which would, or seemed as if it might have,
under different circumstances, justified an inference of intent to
desert. In no case whatsoever was a conviction sustained on the
mere length of absence alone. Typically, the reviewing tribunal
would discuss at length the other circumstances, and not consider
the period of absence at all. As one Board of Review declared
of a six-day absence: "It is no matter that the absence was
short; the brevity thereof was not of his making." ,27 After detail-
ing the other circumstances, the Board also declared: "Under
such circumstances the duration of the absence has but little
weight. ,28
The few cases which have categorized absences of ten days
or less have uniformly agreed that under no circumstances could
they be considered "prolonged." One Air Force Board of Re-
view, for example, in affirming a conviction for desertion where
the accused was absent only two days, made it clear that the
length of absence was not at all probative.29 And one Army Board
of Review called an absence of seven days a "brief period" of
absence,"° while another said of the same period of time: "It is
obvious that the findings of guilty of desertion in this case does
not and may not rest on the length of accused's unauthorized
stitution, Art. 12, § 6, the Governor may remove an officer who has been AWOL for
six months. The maximum limit of punishment for unauthorized absence was
increased in the 1895 table of maximum punishments after 10 days, after 30 days,
and after 90 days, and for desertion after 30 days. Manual for Courts-Martial,
U. S. Army, 1895, p. 53 et seq.
27 ETO 9843, McClain, 21 ETO 223, 225 (1945).
28 Ibid.
29 United States v. Patton, 3 (AF)CMR 156 (ACM 1950).
30 ETO 7379, Keiser, 18 ETO 109 (1945).
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absence, but on other circumstances shown by the record of
trial."3 1
Of special significance is the holding of the Court of Military
Appeals in United States v. Isenberg.32 In this case, the accused
was convicted of desertion, based on a ten-day unauthorized ab-
sence and a confession of intent to desert. The court held that
such a short absence could not serve as the corpus delicti upon
which to allow the introduction of a confession of desertion, and
hence there was insufficient evidence of the requisite intent. It
declared:
Evidence of a short absence without leave does not show that
the offense of desertion has probably been committed. There
is a total absence of facts or circumstances from which an
intent not to return to the service may be inferred. * * *
Summed up, we find ten days' unauthorized and unexplained
absence as the only fact from which we must find that the
offense of desertion was probably committed. Without such
a finding the confession cannot be used in evidence. When
we consider the probabilities which might be extracted from
these facts, they are weighted in favor of absence without
leave and against desertion..
33
It is thus clear that an unauthorized absence of ten days or
less may never be found to be "prolonged." Hence, it must be
held not to be a "prolonged" absence as a matter of law.
3. ABSENCE FROM ELEVEN TO THIRTY DAYS
The precedents dealing with unauthorized absences for
periods between eleven and thirty days are of particular interest
because, although they do not generally hold that such absences
31 CM 336419, Halprin, 5 JC 301, 321 (1950).
32 2 USCMA 349, 8 CMR 149 (1953).
33 Id., at p. 156. See also 1919 Senate Hearings, supra, n. 3 at p. 186, in which
former Acting Judge Advocate General Ansell said: "that would indicate that he
was not a deserter, less than 10 days, which is the presumptive period changing
absence without leave into desertion."
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are prolonged, nevertheless, they do approach the borderline area
as to what a prolonged absence is. There are a fairly representa-
tive group of cases in this area, both sustaining convictions of
desertion below, as well as reversing such convictions.
In all of the cases in which convictions of desertion were
reversed, the opinions are clear that an absence of thirty days
or less is not a prolonged absence. To this effect, and of special
interest, are a group of pre-World War II Army Board of Review
cases. Thus, one Board made reference to "the brevity of his
unauthorized absence" in speaking of a 14-day absence Without
leave." Likewise, where the period of unauthorized absence was
18 days, it was held: "The Board of Review is convinced that
the absence in this case cannot properly be deemed 'much pro-
longed.' P Y35
Somewhat longer periods have received a similar treatment.
Thus, a 24-day period of AWOL was characterized as "not pro-
longed" in one case,36 while a 20-day period was held to be an
"absence * * * of short duration" in another. 7 And in one of
the earliest reported Army Board of Review cases, speaking of
an absence of 20 days, it was held: "The Board of Review is
convinced that the absence cannot be deemed 'prolonged' when
viewed in the light of all the circumstances of the case." 3
Several later cases have taken the same position in regard
to comparable periods of absence.39 Thus, in one early case from
the European Theater of Operations, which involved an absence
of 22 days, a Board held that "a period of unauthorized absence
as short as the one in this case, together with the circumstances
of his apprehension, are insufficient to justify the inference of an
34 C.M 19598g, Parr, 2 BR 313, 315 (1931).
35 CM 196187, Roath, 2 BR 333, 334 (1931).
36 CM 223648, Nugent, 14 BR 39, 41 (1942).
37 CM 198750, Knouff, 3 BR 299, 300 (1932).
38 CM 189658, Hawkins, 1 BR 175, 177 (1930).
39 United States v. Smith, 5 CMR 178 (CM 1952) (19 days) ; ETO 16196, Leone
et al, 30 BR 257 (1945) (20 days); United States v. Geving, 4 (A.F)CMR 128
(ACM 1950) (24 days). In all of these cases the absence was held not to be
"much prolonged."
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intent to desert the service." '40 In a somewhat later case, it was
likewise held: "In this case the absence was of 25 days' duration,
a period which is not so 'much prolonged' as to raise in and of
itself an inference of the required intent." 4' And in a case decided
just before the commencement of the Korean War, a Board char-
acterized as a "tenuous assumption that an unexplained absence
of 26 days was sufficient to show an intent to desert.
' '4
1
A decision in this area of particular interest is Private Row-
land's Case.43 In this case, the accused was gone a full 30 days.
Nevertheless, a conviction of desertion was reversed, with the
Board of Review describing the absence as a "short period
' 44
in one place and a "comparatively brief period of absence '1 45 in
another. And in evaluating these holdings, it must be remem-
bered that the power of Army Boards of Review prior to 1951
was not as extensive as it is today. The present boards may
weigh the evidence, and reverse as a matter of fact,4 but the old
boards were, as a rule, limited solely to errors of law.47 Hence,
these cases in effect hold that an absence of less than thirty days
is not prolonged as a matter of law.
A group of cases in which a finding of intent to desert was
upheld also reinforced the above doctrine.4  Thus, one case de-
40 ETO 1567, Spicocchi, 5 ETO 57, 58 (1944). See also CM 213817, Fairchild, 10
BR 287 (1940).
41 ETO 8631, Hamilton, 19 ETO 355, 357 (1945).
42 CM 344253, Murphy, 10 JO 125, 128 (1950) (BR) rev. on other grounds, 10
JC 130 (1950) (JC, TJAG). See also CM 229525, Sower, 17 BR 167 (1943).
43 CM 200601, Rowland, 4 BR 351 (1933).
44 Id., at p. 352.
45 Id., at p. 353.
46 UCMJ, Art. 66, 10 U. S. C. A. § 866.
47 Article of War 50J, 10 U. S. C. A. § 1522.
48 United States v. Cochran, 7 CMR 400 (ACM 1952) (11 days) ; ETO 9333, Odom,
20 ETO 301 (1945) (20 days) ; ETO 8632, Golding, 19 ETO 361 (1945) (29 days);
United States v. Roux, 3 CMR 232 (CM 1952) (29 days). In all of these cases, it
was held that an intent to desert could not be inferred from the period of absence
alone; and that it was, however, properly inferred from other factors present in
the case. In 1919 Senate Hearings, supra, n. 3 at p. 508, Capt. Eastwood, British
Army, Court-Martial Officer, District of London, during World War I said to the
same effect: "If a man is absent under a month and surrenders, then we alter the
charge to absence without leave. If absent over a month, and arrested, let the
charge go and let the court hear it [desertion]. It is a rough rule we have in the
office."
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scribes an absence of 18 days as "of comparatively short dura-
tion,")4 9 another declares that absences of 19 days and 23 days
"were not of long duration," 5 while still a third categorizes a
22-day absence as a "brief period" of AWOL,5 and each of
them hold that it is only the other circumstances in the case which
permit the finding of an intent to stay away permanently. Like-
wise, in a case in which there were three consecutive AWOLs, a
Board had this to say: "As for the first absence, * * * the
duration (17 days) is too short to give rise in itself to any such
inference." 5 2 And in a similar case, another Board declared:
"As to the first desertion * * * the duration of the absence
(25 days) is not in itself sufficient to raise such inference."
5
Opposed to the authority outlined above are a small group
of cases which hold or imply that an absence of less than thirty
days is, or can be under some circumstances, prolonged. The
earliest of these cases is a very old English decision in which an
officer who was AWOL for 28 days, and then was arrested, was
held to be properly convicted of desertion,54 but there was no
opinion written on this. A similar implication can be found in a
more recent American naval decision 5
The third decision implying that an absence of this duration
49 ETO 15814, DeLoggio, 30 ETO 19, 21 (1945).
50 CM 270939, O'Gara, 45 BR 371, 378 (1945).
51 ETO 7379, Keiser, 18 ETO 109 (1945).
52ETO 9681, Bennett, 21 ETO 159, 162 (1945).
53 ETO 9957, Robinson, 21 ETO 255, 257 (1945).
54James, A Collection of the Charges, Opinions, and Sentences of General Courts-
Martial (1795-1820) p. 300 (London, 1820), Asst. Surgeon J. H. Kennedy (1809).
55 In CMO 11-1928, P. 8, the accused was AWOL for 24 days, when he was ap-
prehended. The convening authority disapproved the finding and sentence, holding
that the intent to desert was not proved, and that only absence over leave was
proved. The Judge Advocate General of the Navy said, however:
"The evidence adduced in this case was sufficient to justify a finding of
guilty of the charge of desertion. The judge advocate proved that the accused
was granted liberty to expire at 7:30 a.m., June 1, 1928, that he failed to
return from that liberty, and that he was delivered on board the U. S. S.
Rigel on June 25, 1928, thereby establishing a prima facie case.
"'The specific intent (to permanently abandon the naval service) may be
inferred, and generally must be, from the acts of the accused-circumstances
and duration of unauthorized absence, or the fact that he was apprehended and
forcibly returned, or other circumstances of the case.'
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
may be prolonged, Captain Lowrance's Case,56 involved an AWOL
of only 12 days. This holding is an example of the general slop-
piness which some pre-1951 Boards of Review on occasion ap-
proached cases before them. 7 The accused, a captain in command
of a mess company, was ordered to have his cooks in white uni-
form for a general's inspection. They were unavailable, and he
could not comply. On April 27, 1941, accused called his com-
mander long distance, told him that he had been relieved of his
command, and was going home. On April 28, accused was marked
AWOL. On April 29, accused's commander received a telegram
from the accused at his home town reading as follows: "Have
retired to my home 110 North Hinckley Street, Holdenville, Okla-
homa. Am available at any time to transfer or adjust any
responsibilities which came under my command." On May 10,
accused voluntarily returned to his station.
Authority is well-nigh unanimous that an AWOL of 12 days
is insufficient to prove intent to desert, even where an accused
is apprehended. Furthermore, it is manifestly contrary to reason
that an officer with 18 years of service who intended to desert
should not only retire to his known home address but, the day
after leaving his station, notify his commanding officer of exactly
where he may be apprehended. Significantly, the two members
of the Board who sat in this case discussed not a single military
precedent in reaching their decision. By the "clear and conclu-
sive" (to use the Board's own terminology in affirming the
conviction) weight of both precedent and reason, this case is not
good law.
Several more cases have categorized an absence of thirty days
or less as prolonged. Thus, one opinion referred to a 22-day
AWOL as "this prolonged absence"; 5s another described a 24-
day AWOL as a "considerably prolonged absence" ;59 still a third
56 CM 218579, Lowrance, 12 BR 93 (1941).
57 This case is a good example of what this author was talking about in his
article, Military Law Brief-Writing, 4 The Practical Lawyer 77, 86 (No. 4, April,
1958).
58 CM 233688, Aievoli, 20 BR 49, 59 (194.3).
59 CM 316347, Fever, 65 BR 305, 307 (1946).
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characterized an absence of 27 days as one "of an extended dura-
tion";e° while a fourth referred to a "protracted" 29 day absence
without leave in its decision."' However, it is important to note
that each of these statements was dictum, for in each of these
cases, there were sufficient other factors to justify a finding of
intent to desert. Thus, in the first of these cases, the accused had
fled a considerable distance from his station after committing
murder; in the second, he had embezzled money; in the third, he
admitted the intent not to return; and in the last, he had escaped
from confinement after expressing dissatisfaction with his mili-
tary status. Thus, in none of these cases was a finding of a
prolonged absence necessary. When this is considered along with
the fact that the statements were made in an off-hand manner
without consideration, it is clear that they are not of much weight
as precedents.
Of somewhat more value is a case from the Mediterranean
Theater of Operations in which there were two absences, one of
49 days and another of 30 days. 2 The accused was apprehended
after both in an active theater of military operations. The Board
of Review declared: "As to each specification, an intention to
remain permanently absent may be inferred from accused's un-
explained, prolonged absence, * * * (and other factors noted). ' 3
However, as to the 30-day absence, the precedent value of the
case is weakened by the fact that the Board referred to the AWOL
in an off-hand, formalized statement, coupling this single refer-
ence with a discussion of the first absence which there is ample
authority to call "prolonged" under the circumstances. This case
therefore cannot be taken to be a positive holding that a 30-day
absence may be a "protracted" one.
It follows, therefore, that by the overwhelming weight of
sound authority, an absence of not over thirty days can never be
60 CM A-286, Stapleton, 1 A-P 87, 93 (1943).
61 CM 259789, Blaich, 39 BR 21, 26 (1944).
62 MTO 4958, Kallas, 6 NATO-MTO 47 (1945).
63 Id., at p. 49.
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considered as a prolonged absence. Hence, it is therefore clear
that an absence of thirty days or less is not prolonged as a matter
of law.
4. ABSENCE FROM THIRTY-ONE TO SIXTY DAYS
a. The "No-Man's Land" Area
In considering whether an absence from 31 to 60 days is
"prolonged" or not, the easiest thing to do is to break this period
up into two parts. The first part of this area includes absences
from 31 to 36 days. This area is in reality a no-man's land area,
with the decisions in unreconcilable conflict. There are holdings
both that an absence of this period is prolonged, as well as hold-
ings that such a period is not prolonged. In some cases, such
contradictory holdings were made by the same tribunals.
For example, there is one naval case declaring that an absence
of 31 days is sufficient to prove an intent to desert.6 4 This case
was decided in peacetime. Nevertheless, in another naval case,
where the AWOL was 35 days, it was held that "as a matter of
law, a finding of the charge of 'Desertion in time of war' could
not be sustained.""
Army Boards of Review have sustained convictions of deser-
tion where the length of absence was 35 days,6 33 days, 67 and
even 32 days. 8 In one of the last-mentioned cases, the Board
held: "The duration of accused's unauthorized absence and the
manner in which it was initiated justify an inference of his intent
to remain away permanently. ' 6 9 Nevertheless, another Army
64 CMO 1-1925, P. 4.
65 C O 9-1945, P. 388. And see United States v. Lawler, 7 CMR 462 (NCM
1953), where a Navy Board of Review held that an absence of 32 days was not
prolonged.
66 CM 205811, Fagan, 8 BR 229 (1936).
67 CM 234716, Stinson, 21 BR 14!7 (1943). However, in this case there was an
additional factor, since the Board declared at p. 151: "Since this Item of proof
(order to report to the New York Port of Embarkation for overseas service) tends
strongly to show a reason for the accused to desert the service."
68 CM 238349, Smith, 24 BR 227 (1943) ; CM 279399, Williams, 52 BR 201 (1945).
69 Williams, 8upra, at p. 205.
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Board reversed a conviction for desertion where the AWOL was
for 32 days,70 and in two World War I cases, the Judge Advocate
General reversed convictions of desertion although the absence
in one case was for 33 days and the accused was apprehended,7
while in the other the AWOL, for 35 days, was initiated when
the accused ran away from his company while it was engaged with
the enemy.72 Likewise, two later cases affirmed convictions for
desertion where the accused was gone for 34 days,7 3 while another
one characterized as a "tenuous assumption that an unexplained
absence of thirty-one days was sufficient to justify an intent to
desert."
74
This conflict has not escaped the United States Court of
Military Appeals. Thus, in one case, by a two to one vote, the
Court held that an intent to desert may be inferred from a 35-day
AWOL.7' On the other hand, also by votes of two to one, in two
cases the Court held that such intent may not be inferred from
an absence of 33 days.76 In each of these three cases, there were
other factors in the record which the Court considered, so the
question of whether the absence was "prolonged" or not is some-
what blurred.
The high-water mark of pre-1951 holdings that an absence
without leave is not prolonged as a matter of law is Private
Standlea's Case.77 In this case, the Judge Advocate General of
the Army declared that an absence of 36 days, terminated by
apprehension, was insufficient to justify a finding of intent to
70 CM 230196, Kennedy, 17 BR 305 (1943).
71 CM 124248 (1919), Dig. Ops. JAG 1912-40, § 416(9), p. 269.
72 CM 129801, Cahn (1919), Dig. CM Rev. (1920), p. 276.
73 ETO 16869, Henry, 31 ETO 197 (1945); ETO 13708, Muldrow, 27 ETO 87
(1945).
74 SpCM 427, Kallenberger, 4 JC 441, 443 (1949). And see United States v.
Ayala, 3 CMR 284, 287 (CM, 1952), holding an absence of 31 days to be "not pro-
longed."
75 United States v. Knoph, 2 USCMA 108, 6 CMR 108 (1952).
76 United States v. Logas, 2 USCMA 489, 9 CMR 119 (1953) ; United States v.
Oliver, 2 USCMA 613, 10 CMR 111 (1953). See also, to the same effect, United
States v. Northern, 4 CMR 761 (ACM 1952) (absence of 34 days).
77 CM 123404, Standlea (1918), Dig. Ops. JAG 1912-40, § 416(8), p. 268.
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desert. This oft-cited opinion is the longest period of time, prior
to the Uniform Code, which has been held not to be prolonged
as a matter of law. Thereafter, all AWOLs have been held to
be prolonged.
b. Private O'Donnell's Case
Probably the most important case ever decided which bears
on desertion is United States v. O'Donne.7 s This landmark deci-
sion, in sharp contrast to the meandering course of previous
cases, stands out like a rock which clearly delimits what a pro-
longed absence is.
In O'Donnell's Case, the aceused received a 36-hour pass and
went absent on leave in England during January, 1944, taking
no equipment. At the expiration of his pass, he remained AWOL
for 37 days and then surrendered. Although he always wore his
uniform, he had no explanation or reason for his absence. Having
been charged with desertion, he was convicted of that offense.
The original Army Board of Review for the European Theater
of Operations, Riter, Chairman,79 and Van Benschoten and Sar-
78 ETO 1629, O'Donnell, 5 ETO 119 (1944).
79 But General Riter has since changed his mind about the value and validity
of the prolonged absence rule. The first inkling this author had of this was in his
review of "The Law of AWOL" in 6 Utah Law Review 150 (1958) where he states
at p. 151:
"This 'prolonged absence' rule effectively made a deserter out of a soldier or
sailor whose only real offense was unauthorized absence for sixty days or more.
One writer on the subject has aptly said: 'If he chose not to testify to explain
his absence, the rule devoured him.' A great many critics of military justice
have for several years condemned this rule but the service persisted in re-
taining it. Finally COMA has buried it. There are few mourners."
This author thereafter wrote to General Riter about the apparent inconsistency
between this comment and O'Donnell, and received the following reply, by letter
dated July 17, 1958:
"With respect to United States v. Uothern, and its antecedent ETO such as
O'Donnell, I am glad you confronted me with the conflict in view point. Frankly.
I changed my mind at the time the Manual for the U. C. M. J. was being
drafted. O'Donnell was decided under the influence of war time conditions
but, as I recall, it was a case which arose not under battle line conditions,
but was a 'garrison' case in England before D- Day. Had this been a battle
line case such as arose during the "Battle of the Bulge" I could justify it.
(See opinion in the case of Slovick which I wrote.) It was when I compared
Slovick with O'Donnell that I changed my mind, but this comparison was not
made until the present Manual was in course of preparation. I had nothing
to do with Its preparation, as I was then out of the service. From time to
time information as to its proposed contents came across my desk and it was
then that I questioned the validity of the 'prolonged absence' presumption and
finally rejected It."
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gent, JA's, held that the evidence was sufficient as a matter of
law for a finding of an intent to desert. The Board, after quot-
ing from that part of the 1928 Manual for Courts-Martial which
deals with right of a court-martial to infer an intent to desert
from a prolonged absence had this to say:
The offense occurred in an active theater of operation in an
allied foreign country, subject to intermittent attack from
air, sea and land, and was, in its compact entirety, at that
time, the base and starting point of American and allied
military operations of the greatest magnitude and of supreme
importance. There was then hardly a town in England that
was not in the neighborhood of an American military post;
certainly there were many such posts in and around Bourne-
mouth, * * *
In deciding that: "Mere absence for a short period * * *
is not desertion in the absence of other circumstances indi-
cating an intent to remain away permanently." A recent
holding of the Board of Review (sitting in Washington, D. C.)
asserts that: "While such circumstances occur more fre-
quently during war than peace, the mere fact that it is time
of war does not make a short absence desertion. CM 226261
(1942)" (Bull. JAG, Nov. 1942, Vol. 1, No. 6, see. 416(9),
p. 325). Winthrop, on the other hand, while recognizing that:
"To infer such intent (not to return) solely from unauthor-
ized absence of but brief duration, especially if followed by
a voluntary return, will commonly be unwarranted," signifi-
cantly qualifies the rule by adding to his statement of it that:
"an absence, however, for a few days or even a part of a
day, may, under certain circumstances, fully justify such an
inference; and, in time of war, an absence of slight duration
may be as significant as a considerably longer one in time of
peace." (Winthrop 's Military Law & Precedents-Reprint
-p. 638). (Underscoring supplied.) To the extent that the
view expressed in the foregoing quotation from the Bulletin
conflicts with Winthrop's qualification of the rule, the latter
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appears to be sounder when applied in an active theater of
operation subject to enemy attack.
In the instant case, accused's own testimony shows that
when his pass expired he was at Bournemouth, which is but
a two-hours' train ride from his station. He was also at
Bournemouth when he surrendered. Whether he spent the
intervening 37 days there or elsewhere is not disclosed
by the record. In either case, his unauthorized absence for
the period shown under prevailing conditions, without any
explanation whatsoever, is wholly consistent with the court's
inference that at some time during the period of his absence
he intended not to return. * * * "A prompt repentence and
return, while material in extenuation, is no defense" (MCM,
1928, par. 130a, p. 142). Under the circumstances shown, the
accused's "repentence and return" are not entitled to be
characterized as "prompt."
O'Donnell's Case was one of the earliest desertion cases decided
in the European Theater of Operations. It was repeatedly cited
thereafter by the Boards in that theater whenever any substantial
question arose in a desertion case. 80 This alone would be enough
to make it an important case, for the European Theater of Oper-
ations had a heavy load of desertion cases, as shown by the
fact that almost a quarter of all of the cases cited in the appendix
are from the Boards in that theater. However, its importance
was increased by the fact that it was cited by boards in other
theaters8 ' and in Washington 2 and eventually by other services
80 See, for example, ETO 17679, Darpino, 32 ETO 377 (1945), in which the Board
of Review, in a case in which the accused was absent for 41 days, held: "It is
unnecessary to consider how much longer accused was out of military control since,
in the absence of an explanation satisfactory to the court this period itself at a
time when hostile forces were active in the theater, is sufiicient to justify the in-
ference that he intended to remain away and the findings of guilty of desertion
may be sustained (CM ETO 1629, O'Donnell)."
81 See CM P-1236, Wilson, & A-P 371 (1945).
82 CM 266918, Freeman, 43 BR 317 (1944) ; CM 302-974, Malarchok, 59 BR 337
(1946); CM 307120, Seewagen, 60 BR 305 (1946); CM 312022, Kavchak, 61 BR
329 (1946) ; CM 312092, Currey et al, 61 BR 363 (1946) ; United States v. Mitchell,
1 CMR 191 (CM 1951) ; United States v. Pascal, 3 CMR 379 (CM 1952).
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as well.8 3 As a recent decision labeled it, this is "a leading
case. ' ,4
The O'Donnell Case, or one with an absence of a few days
less than that, represents the lowest zone within which a court
may find an absence to have been prolonged under any circum-
stances. That this is the proper interpretation of this case is
shown by the following statement made in a subsequent case in
the same theater:
To hold that the record of trial supports a finding of deser-
tion as to La Brake would be, in effect, to extend the doctrine
of CM ETO 1629, O'Donnell. The Board is not disposed so
to do.85
However, the O'Donnell Case should not be taken to mean
that an absence 37 days is always prolonged as a matter of law.
This is not true. The Board of Review, it should be noted,
stressed the fact that the absence occurred during war-time in an
active theater of operations, where there were many military in-
stallations. Each of these factors, while not serving as an inde-
pendent basis for inferring the requisite intent, does tend to
support the inference because it would tend to increase the num-
ber of times the accused was made aware of his dereliction and
yet chose to remain away. Thus, since these factors necessarily
increased the frequency of "choice-points," the duration of the
AWOL could be reduced and yet there would be a sufficient num-
ber of "choice-points" to support the requisite inference that
during one of them a permanent separation was contemplated.
This appears to be the interpretation which the Board impliedly
gave to the passage which it cited from Winthrop, and rightly so.
As a later decision, interpreting the case, declared:
83 United States v. McCrary, 1 CMR 780 (ACM 1951), aff'd 1 USCMA 1, 1 CMR 1
(1951).
84 United States v. Roux, 3 CMR 232, 236 (CM 1952).
85 ETO 16196, LaBrake et al, 30 ETO 257, 261 (1945). Except for the length of
absence, which was twenty days, this case supports a finding of desertion even more
strongly than does O'Donnell, for here the accused went AWOL in a combat zone,
and he was apprehended, and did not surrender.
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In * * * O'Donnell, it was held that under conditions then
prevailing in the European Theater of Operations, proof of
a soldier's wholly unexplained absence without leave from
his station in England, for a period of 37 days terminated
by voluntary surrender is legally sufficient to support the
inference that he intended not to return. The mentioned
Board of Review stresses in its holding that the offense
occurred in an active theater of operations. However, the
case does establish that an absence of 37 days is considered
under the circumstances of that case "much prolonged." 86
It may be argued, as an alternative interpretation of the
passage cited from Winthrop, that the Board of Review, sub
silento considered the possibility that the accused, by his absence,
intended to avoid the hazards of combat incident to war-time
service overseas, and that this supplied a motive for his unex-
plained AWOL. If this interpretation were accepted, it would
supply an additional independent factor on which to base a finding
of intent to desert, and weaken correspondingly the conclusion
that the Board was concerned with, and held that, the presence
of war-time conditions described in its opinion served as more
frequent reminders to the accused of his offense and hence in-
creased the frequency of his decisions to stay away within a given
period of time. Such an alternative interpretation gains some
support from a much later case wherein the accused went absent
after the end of the war in Europe. In this case, a Board held:
Further, the fact that his absence took place after the cessa-
tion of hostilities in this Theater makes it unlikely that he
entertained the intent to remain permanently away from the
service. In general, it may be said that Americans are not
now deserting in Europe."'
However, it appears that this possible alternative interpre-
tation will not withstand close analysis. The accused in O'D on-
86 United States v. McCrary, supra, n. 83, at p. 784.
87 ETO 16104, Blanchette, 30 ETO 203, 205 (1945). The same statement was
made in ETO 15442, Bifano, 29 ETO 165, 168 (1945).
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nell's Case went AWOL in England in January of 1944. He was
subjected to no hazards other than those which faced the English
people as a whole. Of course, it was always possible that he
might be shipped to a fighting front, but it was just as possible
that he would remain in England for the duration of the war.
When accused went AWOL the Normandy invasion was still six
months away. The Board of Review itself handed down its
opinion a full month before the Normandy invasion, and while
it was, presumably at least, top secret. Hence, there was no
specific hazardous duty which the accused would probably desire
to avoid, and it follows that the references to war-time operations
must be taken to mean that they constituted reminders to the
accused of his obligations.
A quite similar situation was before the United States Court
of Military Appeals in United States v. Shuler.8 In this case,
the accused was also gone for 37 days, when he was apprehended.
The absence took place in Korea during the Korean War, but
there is no indication in the opinion that the accused attempted
to avoid the hazards of combat. The accused, in this case as
in O'Donnell, was on or near military installations. Likewise, he
could offer no satisfactory explanation for his absence. A unani-
mous court, speaking through Judge Brosman, upheld the convic-
tion for desertion. He said:
The Government here established a thirty-seven day unau-
thorized absence terminated by apprehension. Accused would
have us hold that an absence for thirty-seven days' duration
is insufficient in any case-even when terminated by appre-
hension-to establish an intent not to return. We cannot
at all subscribe to so broad a proposition."9
Therefore, the O'Donnell Case establishes the doctrine that
an absence of a month or a little over it is the shortest period
of time which can be considered as a "prolonged" absence, and
88 2 USGMA 611, 10 CMR 109 (1953).
89 Id., at p. 110.
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that an absence of this duration is only prolonged when there are
other circumstances which would tend to increase the frequency
of reminders to the accused during this period of AWOL.
c. Thirty-Seven to Sixty Days' Duration
Having established the fact that under some circumstances,
an absence of 37 days is "prolonged", it now remains to be de-
termined what the effect of an ever increasing period of AWOL
is on the necessity for the presence of these circumstances. In
doing so, it must be remembered that "an absence of 37 days is
not clearly an instance of prolonged absence." 90 It is, in fact,
only the minimum period which can be found to be prolonged
even when other circumstances are present. Thus, in a case
from the European Theater of Operations, an accused who was
AWOL for 39 days was tried for desertion terminated by appre-
hension." He said that he had surrendered, but hearsay evi-
dence was introduced that he had been apprehended. The Board
of Review, in reducing a finding of desertion to that of AWOL,
declared:
The admissible evidence approximates the minimum of com-
petent, substantial evidence heretofore held, in the absence
of prejudicial errors or irregularities, legally sufficient to
support the inference of intent not to return in a desertion
case. (CM ETO 1629, O'Donnell.) It is certainly not com-
pelling; and Captain Malkus' erroneously admitted testimony
of apprehension was of a character to preclude the possi-
bility of the court's giving any credence whatsoever to the
explanation involved in the accused's unsworn statement. The
record, fairly regarded, raises a bona fide issue as to accused's
intent, in view of which the hearsay evidence of apprehension
cannot in reason be presumed not to have injuriously affected
the substantial rights of the accused.2
90 United States v. Spruill, 23 CMR 485, 488 (CM 1957).
91 ETO 5740, Gowins, 15 ETO 315 (1945).
92 Id., at p. 317.
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In view of the fact that an AWOL with a duration of 37 days
to one of 60 days is not always a prolonged absence as a matter
of law, one would expect to find differing decisions as to whether
such a period was sufficient to prove the requisite intent, depend-
ing upon the facts of the case other than the length of absence.
This has proved to be so in actuality.
Thus, absences of 40'3 and 41 days0 4 have been held sufficient
in some cases, while in another an absence of 41 days was held
to be insufficient."5 Likewise, a Board of Review in the North
African Theater of Operations, speaking of an AWOL of 42 days,
declared, "The intention to remain permanently absent can be
inferred from his unexplained prolonged absence and the attend-
ant circumstances. 196 However, in United States v. Peterson,97
the Court of Military Appeals held that an absence of 46 days
was insufficient to prove desertion as a matter of law under the
circumstances of that particular case because of the explanation
of the accused. It might be noted that the court did imply that
a 46-day AWOL might be prolonged under some circumstances
in the Peterson case.
As the period of absence begins to lengthen, however, an
increasingly large number of cases denominate it as "prolonged."
In the case of an absence of seven full weeks, no less than five
cases have held that such an absence is prolonged and that an
93CM 106147, McMillen (1917), Dig. CM Rev. (1920), p. 270; ETO 9978, Green
et al, 21 ETO 269 (1945).
94 ETO 527, Astrella, 2 ETO 79 (1943). This case preceded the decision in
O'Donnell by a number of months, but here, while the accused also surrendered,
the Board found specifically that he had entertained an intent to shirk important
service also. By a 2 to 1 vote, the Board held that the absence herein was a
"prolonged absence." See p. 84. See also ETO 9978, Gates et al, 21 ETO 269 (1945).
95 United States v. Hedges, 16 CMR 412 (NCM 1954). It might be noted that
here the Board did not specify whether its decision was based on law or fact.
96NATO 2022, Donnelly, 3 NATO-MTO 343, 3417 (1944). See also ETO 15689,
Fors, 29 ETO 309, 311 (1945), where the Board declared:
"From the mere length of either of such absences alone, for 62 days and 45
days respectively, in an active theater of operations, the court was authorized
to infer an intent on the part of accused to remain permanently away from the
service."
97 2 USCMA 645, 3 CMR 51 (1952).
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intent to desert may be inferred therefrom." One of these is the
first decision in this line of cases where the AWOL took place in
the continental United States before the start of World War II,
and in this case the Board declared that "Time is a decisive
factor which alone, if much prolonged, permits an inference of
intent to desert."99 However, in that case not only was the accused
apprehended, but also he had sent in his resignation as an officer
and taken civilian employment. Hence, this holding must be
taken to mean that the absence was prolonged under the circum-
stances.
Likewise, periods of 53 days,10 55 days, 1 1 and 56 days, 102 all
terminated by apprehension have been held to be sufficient for a
finding of the requisite intent. And in two cases from overseas
theaters, where the length of AWOL was 58 days, the Boards held
that such absence was a prolonged one.1 3 Yet one of the judges
of the Court of Military Appeals has expressed the view that an
absence of 60 days is not a prolonged absence.'"'
From an examination of all of the above cases, it can be seen
that there is a conflict as to what period of time between 30 and
60 days is a prolonged absence. However, a careful analysis of
the cases holding that the absence was prolonged indicates that
almost all of them had other factors which increased the frequency
with which the accused was reminded of his dereliction. This is
particularly true of the majority of cases, those which occurred
98 CM 216904, Frankie, 11 BR 183 (1941); ETO 1515, Smith, 4 ETO 375, 378
(1944), wherein a "prolonged absence" was referred to; ETO 14135, Cerrito, 27
ETO 229, 231 (1945), where the Board declared that "the absence is so prolonged
that intent to desert could have been inferred"; ETO 15206, Burton, 28 ETO 393,
394 (1945), where "the long absence of 49 days" is discussed; MTO 4958, Kallas,
6 NATO-MTO 47 (1945) ; and see United States v. Alexander, 1 CMR 465 (NCM
1951).
99 Frankie, supra, at p. 185.
100 United States v. Uhland, 10 CMR 620 (ACM 1953).
101 United States v. Hensley, 12 CMR 577 (CM 1953).
102 United States v. Vetter, 13 CMR 517 (NCM 1953).
103 ETO 11856, Debeau, 24 ETO 338 (1945) ; MTO 4796, DiGiovachini, 6 NATO-
MTO 25 (1945).
104 United States v. Deain, 5 USCMA 44, 51, 17 CMU 44, 51 (1954), opinion of
Chief Judge Quinn; United States v. McCrary, 1 USCMA 1, 14, 1 CMR 1, 14 (1951),
dissenting opinion of Chief Judge Quinn.
ABSENCE AS PROOF OF INTENT TO DESERT
in the overseas theaters during wartime. Hence, it can be con-
cluded that an absence between 30 and 60 days is not necessarily
prolonged as a matter of law. It can also be concluded that such
a length of absence may be presumed not to be prolonged unless
additional facts are presented by the prosecution which show that
the frequency of reminders to the accused was increased. Of
course, as the absence becomes progressively longer within this
period, the circumstances needed to overcome the presumption
may become progressively fewer, until by the end of the period
in question there is no presumption at all. However, in all cases
within this time period, whether the additional factors are suffi-
cient to raise the frequency-of-reminder level enough so that the
absence may be denominated a "prolonged" one must be consid-
ered as a question of fact.
5. ABSENCE FROM SIXTY-ONE TO NINETY DAYS
As mentioned above, as the length of absence increases, the
cases indicate that the circumstances which would be required to
show that the absence was "prolonged" decrease progressively.
In this scale or spectrum, the period around 60 days appears to
be a turning point. Thereafter, no special circumstances need be
shown for the court to decide that such a period was a protracted
one. On the contrary, it seems that circumstances must appear,
adduced either by the accused, or coming otherwise to the atten-
tion of the court, which would tend to reduce the frequency of the
number of reminders which the accused would normally be ex-
pected to have, before it could at any time be said that as a matter
of law the absence was not a prolonged one.
An examination of the cases wherein the accused was AWOL
for periods ranging from 60 to 90 days reveals that in none of
them was it held that such a period could not be prolonged as a
matter of law. Those cases finding that the absence was pro-
longed and affirming a conviction range throughout the entire
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period. Thus, absences of 65 days,0 5 of 66 days,10 67 days, 07
68 days,0 8 73 days, 109 74 days,110 76 days,' 77 days,112 78 days,"3
80 days,114 82 days,115 85 days,"' 89 days,"7 and 90 days"3 can
all be found which have been characterized as prolonged. Indeed,
in one case from the European Theater of Operations, which
involved an AWOL of 67 days initiated by escape from confine-
ment and terminated by apprehension, the Board of Review de-
clared:
Therefore, assuming that the evidence improperly admitted
as to other specifications (of AWOL) might have resulted
normally in disapproval of the findings * * *, the competent
evidence from which an intent to desert might be inferred is
so compelling and convincing that accused's substantial rights
were not prejudiced. 119
Of perhaps greater significance are those cases within this
period wherein a finding of intent to desert was reversed. For
example, in one of them which involved an absence of 81 days,
105 United States v. Pascal, 3 CMR 379 (CM 1952).
106 ETO 913, Pierno, 3 ETO 149 (1943).
107 CM 235607, Poll, 22 BR 151 (1943).
108 ETO 1519, Bartel, 4 ETO 381 (1944). This was described as a "long con-
tinued absence" at page 382.
109 CM A-2244, Tyree, 3 A-P 195 (1945). The Board in this case declared at page
200 that "Accused's absence of 73 days in a combat zone was 'much prolonged.'"
110 ETO 800, Ungard, 2 ETO 331 (1943).
11 In NATO 73, Walters, 1 NATO-MTO 43 (1943), this is described at page 46
as "this absence of long duration." To the same effect see 'MTO 4373, Ashby, 5
NATO-MTO 165 (1944) and MTO 4957, Millican, 6 NATO-MTO 43 (1945).
112 ETO 5966, Whidbee, 16 ETO 77 (1945).
113 In ETO 14625, Fassnacht, 28 ETO 119, 122 (1945), the Board declared: "The
court was justified in finding that the accused was absent without leave from his
organization for a period of two and one-half months, and from this protracted
absence it had the right to infer intent to desert and to find him guilty as charged
(CM ETO 1629, O'Donnell)."
114 CM 234458, Williams, 20 BR 391 (1943).
115 ETO 6948, Damron, 17 ETO 269 (1945).
118 ETO 1543, Woody, 5 ETO 1 (1944).
117 MTO 4687, Ruggiero, 5 NATO-MTO 271 (1945).
's CM 129946, Hazelhurse (1919), Dig. CM Rev. (1920), p. 272; CM 261405,
Bailey, 40 BR 229 (1944).
119 ETO 14735, Clark et al, 28 ETO 183, 189 (1945).
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the Board of Review conceded that the absence was prolonged
and relied on the accused's explanation to reverse.120 The same
thing happened in another case involving a 77-day AWOL. 121 And
in still a third case, United States v. Henderson,2 2 where the
accused was absent for 82 days, the Judicial Council of the Air
Force, in reversing a finding of intent to desert, relied upon
other factors in the case not dealing with the length of absence
for this holding. They also considered the fact "that he was
intoxicated at the inception and during the greater part of his
absence.'' 23 This last factor, of course, goes to the question of
whether the absence can be considered prolonged under the cir-
cumstances, for when the accused is intoxicated, he is less likely
to have deliberately chosen to stay away; hence this fact tends
to reduce the number of "choice-points" during which the accused
chose to remain away and therefore lengthens the time necessary
for an absence to be prolonged.
Thus, it appears that an absence of between 60 days and 90
days is presumed to be prolonged. The presumption is weak in
the early part of this period, but it becomes progressively stronger
as time goes on, until at the end it becomes a conclusive presump-
tion, or in fact a rule of law.
6. ABSENCE FROM NINETY-ONE DAYS TO SIX MONTHS
An absence from a period of over ninety days to a half year
has been labeled as "prolonged" by the overwhelming weight of
authority, without regard to the attendant circumstances. Here
again, there are many cases so holding. Thus, absences of 96
days, 24 of 97 days, 25 of 103 days,126 of 110 days,'27 of 116 days, 28
120 United States v. Alexander, 4 CMR 226 (CM 1952).
121 United States v. Arocho, 8 CMR 289 (CM 1953).
122 2 (AF) CMR 390 (ACM 1949).
123 Id., at p. 394.
124 ETO 3004, Nelson, 8 ETO 227 (1944).
125 CM 241285, Moudy, 26 BR 251 (1943) ; see also James, op. cit., supra, n. 54,
at p. 110, Quartermaster Robert Young (1802).
126 MTO 4434, Elizondo, 5 NATO-MTO 185 (1945).
127 NATO 2669, Bliss, 4 NATO-MTO 189 (1944).
128 MTO 4544, Gill, 5 NATO-MTO 237 (1944).
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of 119 days, 129 of four months, 30 of four and one-half months,"'
of five months, 32 and of five and one-half months'33 have been
so regarded. Although all of the above cases were ones in which
a finding of desertion was upheld, even most of the cases wherein
such finding was reversed have held that an absence of over three
months is a prolonged one.
For example, a Coast Guard Board of Review held an absence
of 106 days sufficient in law for a court to infer an intent to desert
in United States v. RotskilM but reversed as a matter of fact
because of accused's explanation. The same result was reached
by an Army Board in a case where the length of AWOL was 105
days,'-" and where the absence was for 96 days. 6 An Air Force
Board reached substantially the same result where the AWOL
was for 114 days 3 7 and two Navy ]3oards, in one case where the
absence was for 110 days18 and in another where it was for 113
days,3 9 also held the same way.
Opposed to these holdings are the isolated decisions of two
Air Force Boards. In one of them, it was held:
To us it appears that it should also be clear that an absence
without leave for 95 days should raise doubts in reasonable
minds as to what the accused intended. He may reasonably
at all times have intended to return or have had no specific
intent on the subject one way or the other; or, equally reason-
ably, he may have intended to remain permanently absent.
129 MTO 4689, Tucker, 5 NATO-MTO 275 (1945).
130 MTO 4895, McMahon, 6 NATO-MTO 39 (1945).
131 MTO 4513, Paul, 5 NATO-MTO 233 (1944); CM 335904, Young, 2 JC 317
(1949). See also Beauchamp v. United States, 154 F. 2d 413 (6 Cir., 1946).
182CM 326004, Shelby, 75 BR 111 (1947); ETO 12120, Campbell, 25 ETO 41
(1945).
133 NATO 2373, DiMauro et al, 4 NATO-MTO 53 (1944).
134 12 OMR 649 (CGCM 1953). It is arguable that the AWOL here was only 74
days. See Avins, op. cit., 8upra, n. 6, at p. 178.
135 United States v. James, 13 CMR 506 (CM 1953).
136 United States v. Wilson, 8 CMR 194 (CM 1952).
137 United States v. Palmer, 8 CMR 633 (ACM 1953).
138 United States v. DeGraffenreid, 23 CMR 659 (NCM 1957).
139 United States v. Boland, 16 CMR 417 (NCM 1954).
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On the basis of such an absence, neither extreme is more likely
than the other. We say this because in our experience it is
as likely, if not more than likely, that a person who has been
so absent for 95 days intends to and will return. * * * Hence
we conclude no legal inference may be drawn solely from an
absence without leave for 95 days.1
40
In the other case, which involved an AWOL of 100 days, the Board
declared:
We do not feel that an absence without leave for a period of
three months and eight days alone and of itself, without any
other circumstances, is such a prolonged period as to justify
the drawing of this permissive inference, and predicate
thereon a finding that beyond a reasonable doubt, the accused
did not intend to return, and thereby convict him of so serious
a charge as desertion.
41
While it would be easy to dismiss these two cases as wrong
and against the weight of authority, and let it go at that, these
cases do deserve some attention. They graphically represent the
in vacuo approach to the prolonged absence rule. To say that
absences of this length are not prolonged as a matter of law, and
thus that reasonable men may not infer therefrom the necessary
intent, without an examination of the effect of this absence on
the accused's own activities, is as much an ipse dixit holding as
it would be to say that such an absence is desertion as a matter
of law. A discussion of the rule in refined legal terminology is
no substitute for an examination of the period of absence in
context.
At any rate, the above two cases cannot be considered good
law in light of the recent decision of the United States Court of
Military Appeals in United States v. Hendon.142 In this case, the
Court held that a decision by a Board of Review holding that an
140 United States v. Howe, 6 CMR 753, 760 (ACM 1952).
141 United States v. Green, 5 CMR 588, 589 (ACM 1952).
142 7 USCMA 429, 22 CMR 219 (1956).
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AWOL of 112 days was insufficient as a matter of law to sustain
a finding of intent to desert was erroneous. Judge Latimer de-
clared that "Of course, an absence is 'much prolonged' if a
reasonable person could so regard it, and here such a person
could."' 43 In light of this holding and of previous cases, it must
be considered that an absence of over ninety days is prolonged
as a matter of law.
7. ABSENCE FOR OVER SIX MONTHS
There can be not the slightest doubt, based on past prece-
dents, that an absence without leave in excess of six months is
"prolonged" as a matter of law. The cases are all uniform on
this point. A few representative cases hold that an AWOL of
six months,14 4 six and one-half months,145 seven and one-half
months,'14  nine and one-half months, 47 thirteen months, 48 and
148 Id., at p. 222.
144 ETO 17551, Yanofsky, 32 ETO 241 (1945). In GCMO 39, Navy Dept., Feb.
26, 1901, #3, the Judge Advocate General of the Navy, speaking of a six-month
absence said: "The long period of absence of the accused raises a presumption of
his guilt of the charge of desertion which can only be dispelled by a reasonable
explanation thereof." And in 1919 Senate Hearings, supra, n. 3, at p. 507, Capt.
Eastwood, British Army, Court-Martial Officer of the District of London during
World War I stated: "In an ordinary case of desertion-man absent six months
the charge may be of desertion. A witness comes in and identifies the man in the
jug. That is all you want to prove your case." It is also noteworthy that the
National Defense Act of Canada of 1950, c. 43, 3 Rev. Stat. Canada 3824, chap. 184,
§ 79(3) (1952) provides: "A person who has been absent without authority for a
continuous period of six months or more shall, unless the contrary be proved, be
presumed to have had the intention of not returning to his unit or formation or
the place where his duty requires him to be."
145 ETO 15074, Sutherland, 28 ETO 285 (1945).
146 ETO 17521, Bell, 32 ETO 209 (194).
147CM A-1640, Wozniakowski, 2 A-P 297 (1944). In United States v. Uzzo, 3
USCMA 563, 13 CMR 119 (1953), Chief Judge Quinn, speaking of an absence of
this length, declared for a unanimous court: "The prolonged nature of the ac-
cused's absence was sufficient basis for an inference that he intended to remain
away permanently." See, to the same effect, CMO 22, 1913, P. 2, calling an absence
of 84 months a "long unauthorized absence" which required the accused "to rebut
the presumption of desertion" and CMO 22, 1913, P. 4, Naval Digest, P. 174, #75,
also so characterizing the same period of time. And in CMO 76, 1901, P. 1, Naval
Digest, p. 172, #68, the Judge Advocate General of the Navy, with the Secretary's
approval, stated: "Such a long absence remaining unexplained necessarily tends
to establish the intention to desert."
148 United States v. Muench, 14 CMR 857 (A.CM 1954).
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twenty-three months 149 are prolonged and sufficient to sustain a
finding of desertion. Furthermore, in one case where the accused
was gone for two years,150 and in another where he was gone for
two and one-half years,' 51 Boards of Review in the Air Force and
Coast Guard respectively held that erroneous admission of evi-
dence bearing on his intent was harmless since such intent would
have been inferred from the length of absence anyway.
In the only two fully reported cases wherein a finding of
desertion for an absence of over six months was reversed, it was
nevertheless held that such a period of AWOL made out a prima
facie case of desertion. In one, the accused's reason for absence,
fully corroborated, negatived the inference arising out of a six-
month AWOL."' In the other, the Judge Advocate General of
the Army declared of a one year absence:
Absence without leave for the period alleged and the termi-
nation of his absence is shown by competent evidence. How-
ever, although a prima facie case was made in support of
the prosecution's burden of proving intent to desert, the
strong showing that the unauthorized absence was actually
impelled by the efforts of a psychoneurotic soldier, mentally
weakened by the monotony of a long stay on a lonely island,
to evade what he envisaged as imminent insanity by a change
of environment (illegal, it is true), with the expectation of
then returning to duty, creates a reasonable doubt that he
149 CM 331508, Harvey, 80 BR 43 (1948). In United States v. Stetson, 3 CMR
674 (ACM, 1952), an Air Force Board of Review, speaking of an absence of seven-
teen months combined with other factors, declared at p. 678 that "proof of deser-
tion was virtually conclusive" and that the evidence "was so strongly indicative
of desertion, rather than of mere absence without leave . . . that no lesser included
offense was reasonably raised as an issue in the case." Likewise, in GCMO 22,
Navy Dept., Jan. 29, 1903, where the absence was four years, the Judge Advocate
General, with the approval of the Secretary of the Navy, said: "unless the ac-
cused were able to explain such an extraordinary absence, it would, in my opinion,
have constituted evidence entirely sufficient to convict him of desertion."
150 United States v. Hanlow, 16 CMR 933 (ACM 1954). And In Report of the
Select Committee of the House of Commons on the Army and Air Force Act, 1953-4
(London, 1954), minutes of evidence, p. 20, Assistant Judge Advocate General C. M.
Cahn declared that "if he has been absent for 2 years that would in itself be suffi-
cient to justify a charge of desertion."
151 United States v. Yzaguirre, 19 CMR 585 (CGCM 1955).
152 United States v. Kazmorck, 12 CMR 603 (CM 1953).
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intended to remain permanently absent from Army service.
This is especially confirmed by post-trial events which shed
new light upon the fading mental powers of this unfortunate
man, revealing that his fears of insanity were justified, not
imaginary. The peculiar and unique circumstances in the
instant matter distinguish it from the many sound and estab-
lished cases in which it has been correctly held that civilian
employment and other circumstances similar to those in many
respects during unauthorized absence may establish deser-
tion.153
It therefore follows that an absence without leave of over six
months must be considered as "prolonged" as a matter of law
under all circumstances.
IV. A RATIONALE OF THE PROLONGED ABSENcO RULE
Having examined the prolonged absence rule, both from a
functional standpoint as well as from the viewpoint of precedent,
it now remains to be determined whether any rational synthesis
can be formulated from this mass of confusing, and sometimes
conflicting cases and other authorities. In other words, to put
the question in its simplest form, just how long is "prolonged"
within the meaning of this rule?
Some case reports have frankly thrown up their hands and
surrendered when forced to face this question squarely. They
have bluntly declared that the question cannot be answered. In
one of the clearest of the cases which takes this position, United
States v. Green,54 an Air Force Board of Review stated:
It is just as difficult for us to define how long is a 'much
prolonged absence' as to define how high is up or how hard
is hard or how soft is soft. It is all a matter of relativity.
In cases of absence as the one here in question we should
not attempt to set up a yardstick nor to define the difference
153 CM 315600, Allen, MO-JAGA 163, 167 (1950).
154 Supra, n. 141.
142
ABSENCE AS PROOF OF INTENT TO DESERT
between desertion and absence without leave by the measure
of the length of the absence alone.'
The above case, as well as the passage cited, strikingly illus-
trates the infirmities of the in vacuo approach to the prolonged
absence rule. The question presented is not how long is "long,"
considered as an abstract question, but how long is "long" within
the context of what the rule is attempting to define.
A period of time is long, of course, depending on what it is
being used for. A minute is a long time to hang; but three years
is not long for a person to get a legal education. The question
of how long is "long" herein is to be determined in light of the
problem of how many reminders or "choice-points" the accused
had before his AWOL was terminated.
The clearest type of reminder for an accused to get would
occur when a member of his unit met him, told him that he was
AWOL, and said: "Why don't you come back?" If this happened
once or twice, most people would not think that it indicated an
intent not to return. If it happened ten times, people would, in
the absence of an explanation, begin to suspect that the accused
did not intend to return. If it occurred 30 times, reasonable
people would strongly suspect that the accused did not intend to
return; and if this happened 60 or 90 times they would, absent
some explanation, have no doubt of it.
Of course, there are other types of reminders. Most absentees
would be reminded of their own dereliction by seeing a man in
uniform walking down the street towards them. The frequency
of such reminders would be increased during wartime because
there are more men in uniform. The reading of a newspaper
article or headline about the military would also serve as a re-
minder. Seeing a recruiting poster would also serve as a re-
minder. A multitude of other things would serve the same
purpose.
155 Id., at p. 593.
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Furthermore, time itself, in the case of an absentee, brings
its own types of reminders. When a person has a daily routine
and a job that he likes, when he is busy with his job and other
normal activities, and when he has no guilt for his present status
nor worries of future punishment, days, weeks, and even months
slip by unnoticed. But this is not so with the absentee without
leave. Normally, he has less to occupy his mind with and may
think of his status even more.
In addition, as such absentee's funds run out, he begins to
endure privations because of his AWOL. Of course, it is possible
that he may have an independent source of funds. If this comes
from civilian employment it constitutes strong evidence of deser-
tion. Otherwise, it is unlikely that he has such income; few
absentees are in the social register or spend their days clipping
coupons from a trust fund. Without such income, the longer the
absence is, the more the accused will feel the pinch financially;
and each time he does so, li is reminded of his status. An
absentee who must stand in the rain and hitchhike is reminded
of the comforts of his barracks; one who does not get enough to
eat is bound to picture in his mind the bounty of the mess-hall.
An absentee who repeatedly rejects these reminders to return,
and deliberately continues to endure privations, must dislike the
service intensely to do so. Hence, length of absence supplies an
inference of intent to desert both through motive and by virtue
of the reminders and accumulation of "choice-points" it presents
to the accused.
Of course, the circumstances of particular absences may re-
duce the frequency of "choice-points" or reminders. Probably
the most common of such situations is the fact that the accused
went home to care for a sick or needy spouse, child, or other
relative. These factors are generally given probative weight
because they supply a motive for a limited AWOL, and hence
reduce the probability that at one of the "choice-points" the
accused chose not to return at all. However, they also go to the
very question of whether the AWOL was prolonged or not, for
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such factors would tend to keep the accused preoccupied in his
mind with the problems and therefore reduce the number of
times he thought about his status, resulting in the diminution
of the gross number of "choice-points" in any given period.
The choice of a month as the minimum period which a court
may find to be prolonged under any circumstances means that an
absence under 30 days is not prolonged as a matter of law. Of
course, it does not mean that one who is AWOL less than a month
cannot be a deserter; it merely means that an absence of less
than a month always lacks probative value as far as the intent
is concerned. As has been shown above, an absence of less than
a month is too unlikely to present sufficient "choice-points to the
accused for any inference to be drawn therefrom.
On the other hand, an absence of over 90 days should always
be considered as prolonged as a matter of law. Such an absence,
under any circumstances, presents sufficient "choice-points" to
the accused so that he should be called upon to dispel the other-
wise logical inference that during at least one of these he con-
templated a permanent separation.
Between these two periods of 30 days to 90 days lies an
interim period, wherein whether the absence is prolonged or not
depends so much on circumstances in the case, and is so inter-
twined with the facts of the case, that it must be denominated
as a mixed question of law and fact, rather than a question of
law, and so left to the triers of the fact. The circumstances neces-
sary to find that the absence is prolonged must necessarily be
strongest nearest to the 30-day period; they may get progressively
weaker as the absence lengthens. Likewise, the circumstances
necessary to dispel the presumption that the absence is prolonged
must be strongest when the absence is for almost 90 days, and
may get progressively weaker as the period of absence gets pro-
gressively smaller. In summary, therefore, it appears that an ab-
sence of less than thirty days is not prolonged as a matter of law;
an absence of thirty to sixty days is presumed not to be prolonged,
the presumption getting progressively weaker; there is no pre-
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sumption either way as to an absence of sixty days; an absence
from sixty to ninety days is presumed to be prolonged, the pre-
sumption getting progressively stronger; and an absence of over
ninety days is prolonged as a matter of law. It is believed that
the above rule provides the most satisfactory solution to an other-
wise hopelessly insoluble problem.
V. CONCLusioi
The difference in treatment between absentees without leave
and deserters in military law has existed for centuries. This dis-
tinction has been founded on sound military personnel policies
which require that even those persons who go AWOL be encour-
aged to return and deterred from staying away permanently. In
effectuating this significant military policy, the separate article
denouncing desertion has played a prime part.
In large measure, reliance to prove desertion must be placed
on the prolonged absence rule. The objection made to the use
of this rule, in its final analysis, invariably boils down to an
objection to the use of circumstantial evidence to prove intent to
desert. The short answer to these objections was once stated by
the late Judge Jerome N. Frank as follows:
Implicit in petitioner's argument is a basic objection to reli-
ance upon so-called 'circumstantial evidence.' But courts
and other triers of facts, in a multitude of cases, must rely
upon such evidence, i.e., inferences from testimony as to
attitudes, acts and deeds; where such matters as purpose,
plans, designs, motives, intent, or similar matters, are in-
volved, the use of such inferences is often indispensable.
Persons engaged in unlawful conduct seldom write letters or
make public pronouncements explicitly stating their attitudes
or objectives; such facts must usually be discovered by in-
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ference; the evidence does not come in packages labelled,
'Use me,' like the cake, bearing the words 'Eat me,' which
Alice found helpful in Wonderland.156
In light of the above, the prolonged absence rule performs
an indispensable function in the military law of desertion. Its
restoration and proper use will result in upholding military disci-
pline while observing fairness to the accused.
156 F. W. Woolworth Co. v. N. L. R. B., 121 F. 2d 658, 660 (2d Cir., 1941). In
ETO 13956, Depero, 27 ETO 147, 148 (1945), the Board declared: "The longer the
absence, the stronger, in general, is the presumption of the intent to remain perma-
nently absent and unless admitted by accused, such Intent is only provable by pre-
sumptions and inferences arising from the circumstances shown to have existed.
* . . [a] prolonged and unexplained absence raises a strong presumption . .
[of intent to desert]."
APPENDIX.
Note: This appendix contains a list of all reported desertion cases found by the
author which in his opinion involve the question of whether the absence without
leave found was "prolonged" or not. The list of cases is arranged in two columns,
one in which an intent to desert was held to be "not proved," and one in which such
intent was held to be "proved".
Except in the very rare instance where the reporting court was also the trial
court, these reports are all from appellate tribunals. Different tribunals, of course,
have different scopes of review. One may review only questions of law. Another
may be authorized to weigh the evidence as well. It is assumed that the reader is
familiar with the scope of review. of the several appellate military tribunals. The
words "not proved" mean that the finding of an intent to desert by the court-martial
below was reversed because the evidence adduced, as a matter of law, or fact, as
the case may be, did not permit such an inference, or because, where noted, of
prejudicial error. The word "proved" means that such finding was affirmed.
Each entry below contains the case citation. Next to it is the number of days,
months, or years during which the accused was absent. Entries are made, starting
with the cases in which the AWOL ran for the smallest period of time, and running
consecutively to those cases in which the AWOL was most protracted. Next to that
is a brief list of the principal factors, other than the length of absence, which indi-
cated whether the accused had an intent to desert or not.
Due to the large number of cases cited, and the limited amount of space, it is
obviously impossible to discuss how much weight the appellate tribunal gave to
each factor or piece of evidence in reaching its conclusion. The best that can be
done is merely to list the factors, leaving more detailed analysis to the reader.
Certain common indicia of intent to desert or lack thereof reoccur so frequently
that to save space, abbreviations have been assigned to them. The key to these
abbreviations is listed below, and in the entries, only the abbreviated symbol is
used. Where other factors closely resemble those listed below, and are of about the
same probative weight, the symbol below will be used for them. Thus, where an
accused sought a civilian job, the symbol for his actually having gotten the job is
used, as these factors are of the same probative weight in indicating intent.
ABBREVIATIONS.
A: The absence of accused was terminated by apprehension.
bla: While AWOL, the accused engaged in black market activities.
cc: The accused wore civilian clothes while AWOL.
cha: The accused went AWOL while charged with an offense.
che: The accused passed worthless checks before or during his AWOL.
cj : The accused worked at a civilian job while AWOL.
com: The accused evaded combat duty by absenting himself.
con : The accused admitted an intent to remain away permanently.
cri: The accused committed other crimes or offenses before or during AWOL.
da: Number of days accused was AWOL.
dfs: The accused traveled a great distance from his station while absent.
dis: The accused disliked his unit or the military service.
efc: Accused's absence was initiated by an escape from confinement.
emb: Accused committed embezzlement before or during his AWOL.
fi: The accused assumed a false identity while absent. For example, he pre-
tended to be a lieutenant when he was only a private.
fn: The accused gave a false name or serial number.
for: The accused committed forgery before or during his AWOL.
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fs: The accused assumed a false status while absent. For example, he said that
he was discharged when he was AWOL.
lar: The accused committed larceny before or during his AWOL.
lea: The accused left the country in which he was stationed while AWOL.
mo: Number of months accused was AWOL.
oth: The accused committed other AWOLs or desertions which showed his intent.
pe: The court below committed prejudicial error.
rob: The accused committed robbery before or during his AWOL.
rs: The accused went AWOL to aid a sick relative, spouse, or child or one in
financial need.
S: The absence of accused was terminated by surrender.
sea: The accused evaded overseas shipment by absenting himself.
yr: Number of years accused was AWOL.
NOT PROVED.
a. 0-10 days.
U. S. v. Scheaffer, 9 CMR 847 (ACM, 1953), 15 minutes, A, efc, lar.
CM 261112, Allen, 40 BR 145 (1944), 1 hour, S, efc (dicta).
CMO 1-1945, P. 9, 2 hours 55 minutes, A.
CMO 3-1944, P. 439, 6 hours, A, efc.
CM 221491, Peloquin, 13 BR 175 (1942), 14 hours, A.
CM 223489, Madison, 14 BR 1 (1942), 1 da, A, dfs.
CM 223517, Rebraca, 14 BR 15 (1942), 1 da, A.
CMO 2-1943, P. 91, 2 da, A, efc.
CMO 12-1946, P. 385, 2 da, A, efc.
Winthrop, Dig. Ops. JAG, 1895, p. 347, # 28, 3 da, A.
U. S. v. Bedner, 13 CMR 556 (NCM, 1953), 3 da, A, efc.
CM 249731, Marlin, 32 BR 177 (1944), 4 da, A, prepared to return.
CMO 4-1927, P. 14, 4 da.
CMO 2-1946, P. 49, 4 da, A.
CM 125887, Ford (1919), Dig. CM Rev. (1920), p. 271, 5 da, A.
CM 208462, Meier, 9 BR 9 (1937), 5 da, S, dfs, cc, near home.
CM 245568, Clancy, 29 BR 215 (1943), 5 da, A.
CM 261111, Kuykendall, 40 BR 141 (1944), 5 da, A, dfs.
CM%1 330310, Rucker, 79 BR 1 (1948), 5 da.
ETO 16104, Blanchette, 30 ETO 203 (1945), 5 da, A, illegal activities.
GCMO 36, Navy Dept., Feb. 23, 1901, 5 da, S, rs.
CMO 8-1932, P. 7, 5 da, A.
U. S. v. Isham, 11 CMR 880 (ACM, 1953), 5 da, A, efc.
CM 220237, Neusom, 12 BR 369 (1942), 6 da, A.
CM 318467, Johnson, 67 BR 325 (1947), 6 da, A, breached restriction.
ETO 12128, Bailey, 25 ETO 45 (1945), 6 da, A, efc.
ETO 15442, Bifano, 29 ETO 165 (1945), 6 da, A, efc.
U. S. v. Huff, 19 CMR 603 (CGCM, 1955), 6 da.
CM 222861, Fragassi, 13 BR 329 (1942), 7 da, A, returning.
ETO 5593, Jarvis, 15 ETO 229 (1945), 7 da.
CMO 1-1943, P. 64, 7 da, S.
GCMO 118, Navy Dept., Oct. 11, 1897, 8 da, A, cc, bought tools for cj, kept uniform.
CM 213822, Pettitt, 10 BR 291 (1940), 8 da, S.
CM 216361, Weber, 11 BR 133 (1941), 9 da, S.
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CM 133701, MacDonald (1919), Dig. CM Rev. (1920), p. 277, 10 da, S.
CM 262347, Moore, 41 BR 43 (1944), 10 da, S.
ETO 5234, Stubinski, 14 ETO 257 (1945), 10 da, S.
Naval Digest, p. 168, # 4, CMO 30, 1910, P. 6, 10 da.
CMO 4-1950, P. 185, 10 da, A.
U. S. v. Isenberg, 2 USCMA 349, 8 CMR 149 (1953), 10 da.
U. S. v. Leon, 10 CMR 630 (ACM, 1953), 10 da, A, efc, went home, returning to base.
b. 11-80 daVs.
CM 125904, Moore (1919), Dig, Ops. JAG 1912-40, Sec. 416(8), p. 268, 11 da, A.
ETO 1395, Saunders, 4 ETO 261 (1944), 11 da, S, efc.
CM 127372, Diamond (1919), Dig. Ops. JAG 1912-40, Sec. 416(9), p. 268, 12 da, S.
U. S. v. Jenkins, 1 USCMA 329, 3 CMR 63 (1952), 12 da (dicta).
CM 226261, Wilcox, 15 BR 55 (1942), 13 da, A.
CM 195988, Parr, 2 BR 313 (1931), 14 da, A, cc.
ETO 5593, Jarvis, 15 ETO 229 (1945), 14 da.
U. S. v. Arnold, 10 CMR 233 (CM, 1953), 14 da.
GCMO 81, Navy Dept., July 15, 1897, 15 da, A.
CM 130352, Denault (1919), Dig. CM Rev. (1920), p. 274, 15 da, A, fn, took no
baggage.
CM 24556, Clancy, 29 BR 215 (1943), 15 da, S.
ETO 13655, Click, 27 ETO 71 (1945), 15 da.
CM 120894, Allen (1918), Dig. Ops. JAG 1912-40, Sec. 416(8), p. 267, 16 da, A, fn.
CMO 10-1945, P. 412, 16 da, A.
CMO 1-1947, P. 13, 16 da, A.
CM 205916, Williams, 8 BR 235 (1936), 17 da, 5, dfs.
CM 196187, Roath, 2 BR 333 (1931), 18 da, A, cc.
NATO 219, Keir, 1 NATO-MTO 165 (1943), 18 da, A.
CM 196776, Malaloha, 3 BR 35 (1931), 19 da, A, cc.
CM 225533, Kauffman, 14 BR 291 (1942), 19 da, A, dfs, dis, (BR-proved) by TJAG.
U. S. v. Smith, 5 CMR 178 (CM, 1952), 19 da, oth, cj, rs, went home.
CM 122759, Rush (1919), Dig. CM Rev. (1920), p. 275, 20 da, A.
CM 189658, Hawkins, I BR 175 (1930), 20 da, A, rs, telephoned post.
CM 198750, Knouff, 3 BR 299 (1932), 20 da, S.
CM 216361, Weber, 11 BR 133 (1941), 20 da, S, breach of arrest.
ETO 5234, Stubinski, 14 ETO 257 (1945), 20 da, S.
ETO 16196, Leone et al., 30 ETO 257 (1945), 20 da, A.
CM 213817, Fairchild, 10 BR 287 (1940), 22 da, A, near post.
ETO 1567, Spicocchi, 5 ETO 57 (1944), 22 da, A.
CM 196867, Swenson, 3 BR 43 (1931), 23 da, S, cc.
CM 223648, Nugent, 14 BR 39 (1942), 24 da, S, oth, dfs, disobeyed order to return,
home (proved-BR) by TJAG.
ETO 6497, Gary, 17 ETO 67 (1945), 24 da.
ETO 11924, Polidoro, 24 ETO 370 (1945), 24 da, A.
U. S. v. Geving, 4 (AF) CMR 128 (ACM, 1950), 24 da, S.
ETO 6039, Brown, 16 ETO 89 (1945), 25 da, S.
ETO 8631, Hamilton, 19 ETO 355 (1945), 25 da, A.
CM 344253, Murphy, 10 JC 125 (1950), 26 da, A (dicta).
CM 229525, Sower, 17 BR 167 (1943), 27 da, S, dfs.
ETO 13174, Druce, 26 ETO 177 (1945), 28 da, S.
U. S. v. Green, 2 (AF) CMR 523 (ACM, 1950), 28 da, S.
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CM 126150, Abels (1919), Dig. CM Rev. (1920), p. 271, 30 da, A.
CM 200601, Rowland, 4 BR 351 (1933), 30 da, S.
CM 223160, Libonati, 13 BR 359 (1942), 30 da, S.
U. S. v. Morris, 20 CMR 412 (CM, 1955), 30 da.
c. 81-60 days.
SpCM 427, Kallenberger, 4 JC 441 (1949), 31 da, A (dicta).
U. S. v. Ayala, 3 CMR 284 (CM, 1952), 31 da (dicta).
CM 230196, Kennedy, 17 BR 305 (1943), 32 da, S.
U. S. v. Lawler, 7 CMR 462 (NCM, 1953), 32 da, A, efe, cc.
CM 124248 (1919), Dig. Ops. JAG 1912-40, Sec. 416(9), p. 269, 33 da, A, rs.
U. S. v. Logas, 2 USCMA 489, 9 CMR 119 (1953), 33 da A (2-1).
U. S. v. Oliver, 2 USCMA 613, 10 CMR 111 (1953), 33 da, A, rs, went home.
U. S. v. Northern, 4 CMR 761 (ACM, 1952), 34 da, dfs, oth.
CM 129801, Cahn (1919), Dig. CM Rev. (1920), p. 276, 35 da, S, com.
CMO 9-1945, P. 388, 35 da, A, cc, rs, returning to base.
CM 123404, Standlea (1918), Dig. Ops. JAG 1912-40, Sec. 416(8), p. 268, 36 da, A.
U. S. v. Spruill, 23 CMR 485 (CM, 1957), 37 da, A, dfs, dis, cj, pe.
CM 294895, Hatfield, 58 BR 9 (1945), 39 da, pe.
ETO 5740, Gowins, 15 ETO 315 (1945), 39 da, pe.
U. S. v. Hedges, 16 CMR 412 (NCM, 1954), 41 da.
U. S. v. Peterson, 2 USCMA 645, 3 CMR 51 (1952), 46 da, S, re-enlisted.
U. S. v. Robles-Robles, 14 CMR 250 (CM, 1953), 46 da, A, rs, cc, dfs, at home.
CM 115452, Sperry (1918), Dig. CM Rev. (1920), p. 271, 47 da, A.
GCMO 14, Navy Dept., Mar. 11, 1895, 48 da, S, cc, denied intent, communicated with
Navy.
U. S. v. Alexander, 1 CMR 465 (NCM, 1951), 49 da, S. testified intent to return.
CMO 37, 1909, P. 8, 49 da, S (dicta).
U. S. v. Arocho, 8 CMR 289 (CM, 1953), 51 da, S, rs.
CMO 5-1949, P. 110, 51 da, pe.
U. S. v. Uhland, 10 CMR 620 (ACM, 1953), 53 da, A, cc, rs.
U. S. v. Evans, 1 (AF)CMR 114 (ACM, 1948), 57 da, A, cj, rs, pe.
U. S. v. Mize, 11 CMR 587 (NCM, 1953), 59 da, A, rs.
d. Over 60 days.
CM 231469, Marcellino, 18 BR 217 (1943), 62 da, A, pe.
U. S. v. Nash, 1 USCMA 538, 4 CMR 130 (1952), 65 da, pe.
GCMO 140, Navy Dept., Nov. 23, 1896, 68 da, S.
U. S. v. Ingraham, 1 (AF)CMR 520 (ACM, 1949), 68 da, A, fs, cc, cJ, fn, sea, rs,
veteran, gave address, debts, liked service.
U. S. v. Cantu, 2 CMR 220 (CM, 1951), 72 da, S, rs, sea.
U. S. v. Arocho, 8 CMR 289 (CM, 1953), 77 da, S, marital trouble.
U. S. v. Alexander, 4 CMR 226 (CM, 1952), 81 da, S, sea, attempted return.
U. S. v. Henderson, 2 (AF) CMR 390 (ACM, 1949), 82 da, S, drunk, expressed intent
to return.
CMO 11-1933, P. 6, 94 da, S, cj, debts.
Hough, Precedents in Military Law (1855), p. 148, 94 da, A, drunk.
U. S. v. Howe, 6 CMR 752 (ACM, 1952), 95 da, S, dis.
U. S. v. Wilson, 8 CMR 194 (CM, 1952), 96 da, A, rs, round trip ticket.
U. S. v. Carlson, 12 CMR 643 (NCM, 1953), 96 da, pe.
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U. S. v. Green, 5 CMR 588 (ACM, 1952), 100 da, S.
GCMO 121, Navy Dept., Nov. 4, 1896, 103 da, S.
U. S. v. James, 13 CMR 506 (CM, 1953), 105 da, A, rs.
U. S. v. Rotski, 12 CMR 649 (CGCM, 1953), 106 da, A, rs.
U. S. v. DeGraffenre-d, 23 CMR 659 (NCM, 1957), 110 da, A, said intended to return
(2-1).
GCMO 132, Navy Dept., Nov. 21, 1896, 113 da, S.
U. S. v. Boland, 16 CMR 417 (NCM, 1954), 113 da, A, told reason.
U. S. v. Palmer, 8 CMR 633 (ACM, 1953), 114 da, dfs, said intended to return.
Griffin v. United States, 115 F. Supp. 509 (W. D. Ark., 1953), rev. on other grounds,
216 F. 2d 217 (8 Cir., 1954), 116 da, cj, ill, home, stated intent to return.
U. S. v. Brussow, 3 CMR 290 (CM, 1952), 143 da, A, fi, fs, pe.
CMO 1-1951, P. 18, 4 mo, A, pe.
GCMO 158, Navy Dept., Dec. 21, 1897, 5 mo, S, denied intent, pe.
U. S. v. Lee, 15 CMR 495 (CM, 1954), 5 mo, A, cc, pe.
CM 343838, Smith, 9 JC 347 (1950), 5 mo, A, rs, cj, pe.
U. S. v. Kazmorck, 12 CMR 603 (CM, 1953), 6 mo, A, rs, at home.
GCMO 159, Navy Dept., Dec. 21, 1899, 6j mo, A, pe.
GCMO 51, Navy Dept., June 26, 1894, 9 mo, S.
GCMO 55, Navy Dept., June 7, 1897, 9 mo, S, denied intent, pe.
GCMO 12, Navy Dept., Feb. 1, 1897, 10 mo, S, pe.
CMO 6-1949, P. 137, 11j mo, A, pe.
CM 315600, Allen, MO-JAGA 163 (1950), 1 yr, A, cc, cj, nearly insane.
CM 135431, Phillips (1919), Dig. CM Rev. (1920), p. 278, 11 yr, S, rs.
U. S. v. Peters, 19 CMR 600 (CGCM, 1955), 1 yr. 7 mo, A, evaded A, dis, cj, pe.
CM 279842, Potens, 52 BR 345 (1945), 1 yr 9 mo, A, pe.
CM 313446, Cunnagin, 63 BR 71 (1946), 2 yr, 5, cc, cj, rs (pe 2-1), rev. on other
grounds by TJAG and Und. Secy. of War, 81 BR 443 (1946).
CM 320618, Gardner, 70 BR 71 (1947), 2 yr 7 mo, pe.
U. S. v. Swain, 8 USCMA 387, 24 CMR 197 (1957), 12 yr, A (pe 2-1).
PROVED.
a. 0-10 day8.
Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents, 2d Ed. 1920 Reprint, p. 638, n. 32, G.C.M.O.
33, Dept. of the Mo., 1870, 1 hour, A, fleeing.
ETO 12045, Friedman, 25 DTO 17 (1945), 2 hours 15 minutes, com, prior desertion.
CM 192882, Hilburn et al, 2 BR 43 (1930), 51 hours, A, efc, ran from officers.
Ram v. Tafe, 33 J. P. 38 (Q. B. 186), 10 hours, A, efc, emb.
CM 234964, Furtado, 21 BR 217 (1943), 20 hours, A, efc, lar, violence.
CM 193003, Simpkins, 2 BR 67 (1930), 1 da, A, conspired to desert.
CM 202951, Wyatt, 6 BR 385 (1935), 1 da, A, lar.
CM 211898, Shelton, 10 BR 153 (1939), 1 da, A, con.
CM 226833, Joseph, 15 BR 149 (1942), 1 da, A, con, rob, fi, fs.
CM 234601, Giardina, 21 BR 69 (1943), 1 da, A, con, cc.
CM 235227, Bernard, 21 BR 341 (1943), 1 da, A, efc, oth, lar, cri.
CM 235668, Udovich et al, 22 BR 189 (1943), 1 da, A, efc, rob, cri, cc, lea.
CM 255741, Parker, 36 BR 175 (1944), 1 da, efc, under long sentence.
CM 257550, O'Connor, 37 BR 163 (1944), 1 da, A, efe, dfs, cri.
CM 312890, Craver, 62 BR 319 (1946), 1 da, A, efc, for murder.
ETO 2828, Kulaga, 8 ETO 61 (1944), 1 da, A, efc.
U. S. v. Isham, 11 CMR 880 (ACM, 1953), 1 da, A, efc, dfs, tried to finance trip.
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CM 226512, Lubow, 15 BR 105 (1943), 2 da, A, lar, requested funds.
U. S. v. Patton, 3 (AF)CMR 156 (ACM, 1950), 2 da, A, cc, lea, lar, con.
CM 196619, Goyette et al, 3 BR 27 (1931), 3 da, A, rob, lar.
CM 227204, Hughes, 15 BR 213 (1942), 3 da, A, cc, dfs.
CM 238485, Rideau, 24 BR 263 (1943), 3 da, A, efc, cc, cj.
CM 257165, Maple, 37 BR 47 (1944), 3 da, A, dis, lea, fn, fi, aided enemy.
CM 196619, Curtis et al, 3 BR 27 (1931), 4 da, A, rob, lar.
CM 136061, Weatherby (1920), Dig. CM Rev. (1920), p. 272, 5 da, A, cc, lar, fn.
CM 196619, Bland et al, 3 BR 27 (1931), 5 da, A, rob, lar.
ETO 960, Fazio et al, 3 ETO 189 (1943), 5 da, A, efc, fn, lea.
CM 229813, Turner, 17 BR 225 (1943), 6 da, S, efc, cc, dfs, cha.
CM 270591, Vanzant, 45 BR 313 (1945), 6 da, A, efc, dfs, oth.
CM 274989, Smith, 47 BR 393 (1945), 6 da, A, cha, concealed self.
CM 274990, Baxley, 48 BR 1 (1945), 6 da, A, cha, cc, concealed self.
ETO 960, Nelson et al, 3 ETO 189 (1943), 6 da, A, efc, fn, lea.
ETO 9843, McClain, 21 ETO 223 (1945), 6 da, A, cc, fi.
ETO 11201, Livingston, 24 ETO 1 (1945), 6 da, efc, lea.
ETO 11202, Moore, 24 ErO 7 (1945), 6 da, efc, lea.
ETO 11830, Green et al, 24 ETO 313 (1945), 6 da, A, at gun point, cri, bla, con.
CM 221662, Knight, 13 BR 211 (1942), 7 da, A, oth.
ETO 1645, Gregory, 5 ETO 167 (1944), 7 da, S, efc, fn, fi, reluctant to return.
ETO 7379, Keiser, 18 ETO 109 (1945), 7 da, A, efc, oth, resisted arrest.
NATO 2376, Shrum, 4 NATO-MTO 63 (1944), 7 da, A, oth, fi.
CM 336419, Halprin, 5 JC 301 (1950), 7 da, A, lea, cc, fi, che, false orders.
ETO 1036, Harris, 3 ETO 293 (1943), 8 da, A, cc, fi.
CM 196199, Casey, 2 BR 343 (1931), 9 da, A, cc, dfs, emb.
CM 187800, Michalowski, 49 BR 9 (1929), 9 da, A, cc, lar.
ETO 656, Taylor, 2 ETO 205 (1943), 9 da, A, efc, lea, con, fi.
NATO 2490, Waddell, 4 NATO-MTO 107 (1944), 9 da, A, dfs, con.
CM A-1747, Jenkins, 2 A-P 362 (1945), 9 da, A, efc, dfs, cc, fi, cri.
CM 229635, Farris, 17 BR 205 (1943), 10 da, A, dfs, lar, con, went with prisoners.
ETO 16342, Wiseman, 30 ETO 323 (1945), 10 da, A, con.
U. S. v. O'Brien, 2 CMR 531 (CM, 1952), 10 da, efc, lea, cha.
b. 11-20 days.
CM 195705, Tyson, 2 BR 267 (1931), 11 da, A, cc, lar.
CM 236503, Gain, 23 BR 21 (1943), 11 da, A, efc, cc, cri.
ETO 2410, McLaren, 6 ETO- 365 (1944), 11 da, A, cc, ci.
ETO 9681, Bennett, 21 ETO 159 (1945), 11 da, A, efc. oth.
U. S. v. Cochran, 7 CMR 490 (ACM, 1952), 11 da, A, dfs, lar.
CM 161833 (1924), Dig. Ops. JAG 1912-40, Sec. 416(9), p. 269, 12 da, dfs.
CM 218579, Lowrance, 12 BR 93 (1941), 12 da, S, went home.
CM 226871, Green, 15 BR 171 (1942), 12 da, A, dis, oth.
CM 230290, Crouch, 17 BR 355 (1943), 12 da, con.
ETO 12239, Blackshear, 25 ETO 89 (1945), 12 da, A, efc, resisted arrest.
ETO 16620, Tarver, 31 ETO 71 (1945), 12 da, efc, other escapes.
CM A-1747, Jenkins, 2 A-P 362 (1945), 12 da, A, efc, dfs, cc, fi, cri.
CM 345000, Langley, 12 JC 215 (1951), 12 da, A, cc, oth, cha.
CM 226512, Lubow, 15 BR 105 (1943), 13 da, A, efc, dfs, cc.
NATO 3041, Dorsey, 4 NATO-MTO 371 (1944), 13 da, A, fn, cri, was escaped
prisoner.
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U. S. v. Packard, 11 CMR 640 (NCM, 1953), 13 da, A, oth.
CM 309496, Mathieu, MO-JAGA 449 (1950), 14 da, A, efc, fn, fi.
CM 226871, Green, 15 BR 171 (1942), 15 da, A, oth, dis, cc, avoided A.
CM 234521, Culberson, 21 BR 29 (1943), 15 da, A, efc, dfs, fi.
CM 234522, Ford, 21 BR 35 (1943), 15 da, A, efc, dfs, fi.
ETO 875, Fazio, 3 ET0 31 (1943), 15 da, A, efc, cc, ej, con.
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CM 313595, Thomas, 63 BR 193 (1946), 1 yr 9j mo.
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GCMO 22, Navy Dept., Jan. 29, 1903, 4 yr, A (dicta).
CMO 11-1945, P. 459, 4 yr, A.
8. Over 4 years.
CM 335486, Paris, 2 JC 131 (1949), 4j yr, A.
CMO 1-1931, P. 33, 4j yr, S.
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U. S. v. Jaffey, 3 (AF)CMR 51 (ACM, 1950), 4 yr, A, cj.
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U. S. v. Madro, 7 CMR 690 (ACM, 1952), 6 yr, S, dfs.
U. S. v. Higgins, 5 CMR 405 (ACM, 1952),,7 yr, A.
U. S. v. Jackson, 3 (AF) CMR 53 (ACM, 1950), 7 yr, A, cj.
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Rex v. Secy of State (Ex Parte Halperin), (1951) 2 T.L.R. 302, 8j yr, A.
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In re Davidson, 4 Fed. 507 (S.D.N.Y., 1880), rev. on other gr. 21 Fed. 618 (C.C.N.Y.,
1884), 8j yr, A (dicta).
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